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5A B S T R A C T
In this policy paper, based on research ﬁ ndings from twenty case 
studies of donor-supported projects in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Bulgaria and Macedonia, we assess the eﬀ ects of ﬁ ve years of anticorrup-
tion projects and high-proﬁ le public awareness campaigns in the 
Southeastern European region. As a starting point, the paper posits 
that while projects seem to have succeeded in raising demand for 
reform, solutions to match that demand have yet to be found. Th e 
authors question both what reforms or change in particular the projects 
raised demand for, and what success the solutions applied thus far 
may claim. Th e donor community’s failure to meet the high public 
expectations that their projects fostered comes against a disturbing 
backdrop of falling trust in democratic institutions in the region. 
Th e paper underlines the urgency to respond to citizens’ needs. Th e 
authors argue that the impact of reviewed projects was mostly of short 
duration, if at all. Projects generally failed to create a self-sustaining 
constituency to further their work, and when success was achieved 
it often depended heavily on contingent factors such as the presence 
of a “champion” or an exceptional level of donor resources targeted 
for a single, receptive client. Th e most successful projects provided 
direct beneﬁ ts to a well-deﬁ ned constituency. In all cases, the projects 
listed reducing corruption as one of their core objectives; yet based 
on interview material and project reports, none of the donors claimed 
that their projects had eﬀ ectively reduced corruption. In conclusion, 
the paper argues that donors should seek to build sustained public 
demand for a realistic, long-term anticorruption reform agenda. 
6Th is can be achieved by moving away from the ﬁ ght against corruption 
per se—characterized by large-scale awareness raising and broad NGO 
coalitions—and towards mobilizing well-deﬁ ned constituencies behind 
focused governance reforms that have a clear impact and beneﬁ ts for 
those involved; and by encouraging citizens to ﬁ ght corruption through 
the democratic, political mechanisms of representation by supporting, 
among others, political party reform. If anticorruption reforms are 
layered within the political process and meet public needs, the long-
awaited mobilizational potential of the anticorruption agenda might 
yet be realized.
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From the Ground Up
Assessing the Record of Anticorruption 
Assistance in Southeastern Europe
By Martin Tisné and Daniel Smilov
Public perceptions of the importance of tackling corruption in 
Southeastern Europe have reached record highs. In the region that 
spearheaded the donor community’s recent focus on anticorruption 
assistance, over ﬁ ve years of anticorruption projects and high-proﬁ le 
public awareness campaigns have led to the topic being ﬁ rmly 
implanted within contemporary political discourse. Anticorruption 
assistance in Southeastern Europe has now reached a crossroads, where 
perceptions of corruption as a major policy issue are high, but results 
in the ﬁ ght against corruption are generally perceived as unsatisfactory. 
Projects have succeeded in raising demand for reform, but solutions to 
respond to this demand have yet to be found. 
Th e crisis of political representation—citizens lacking trust in their 
elected leaders—is the most serious problem facing the Southeastern 
European region. In a recent paper on the state of democracy across 
Southeastern Europe, Ivan Krastev writes that “the growing gap that 
divides publics from elites and the growing mistrust that publics feel 
towards democratic institutions are the most salient political facts in the 
Balkans today.”1 Economic growth in the region as a whole is mostly fair 
1 Ivan Krastev, “Th e Balkans: Democracy without Choices,” Journal of Democracy 13:3 
(July 2002).
The crisis of political 
representation is the most 
serious problem facing the 
Southeastern European region
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to good (with the exception of Bosnia and Herzegovina); it is politically 
and socially that the region is in crisis. To local observers, most 
Southeastern European countries are formalistic, non-participatory 
democracies, coupled with corrupt, non-functioning institutions 
where the administration seems incapable of making a change in 
people’s daily lives. So far in the transition process, citizens have seen 
social equality go down and be replaced with the harsh inequality of 
the present system. It is against this backdrop that the eﬀ ects of donor-
supported anticorruption assistance should be assessed. 
All over the region, citizens have become increasingly cynical of 
the eﬀ ects of anticorruption campaigns and rhetoric.2 Combined 
with falling trust in democratic institutions, this cynicism threatens to 
undermine public support for necessary political and economic reforms. 
Th e current situation is paradoxical. For several years, anticorruption 
rhetoric was successfully used to mobilize public support behind reform 
policies. Now that the public is becoming increasingly frustrated by the 
lack of visible results in the ﬁ ght against corruption, the mobilizing 
potential of anticorruption activities and rhetoric is wearing thin. At 
worst in this situation, anticorruption rhetoric risks fuelling public 
distrust in government and the democratic political process, and 
creating a fertile ground for unconstructive, populist critics of reforms 
which occupy the place of a policy alternative. 
Donors have tended to lay the blame with recipient governments 
for the situation, arguing that the governments’ lack of political will to 
ﬁ ght corruption is responsible for the failure of larger reform packages. 
Th e question is whether lack of political will is a suﬃ  cient explanation 
for the current situation, and/or whether anticorruption assistance itself 
might not have partly contributed to this situation, and hence fuelled 
the crisis of political representation that besets the region. In this study, 
2 Th e authors deﬁ ne an “anticorruption campaign” as any reform eﬀ ort that is 
speciﬁ cally and explicitly geared towards ﬁ ghting corruption. Th us a national 
anticorruption strategy, as well as a civil society-led anticorruption coalition would 
both qualify under the general heading of anticorruption campaigns. 
F R O M  T H E  G R O U N D  U P  
15
the Soros Foundations Network and the Center for Policy Studies at 
Central European University set out to explore these questions by 
assessing the eﬀ ects of the donor-supported anticorruption projects 
implemented in the region over the past ﬁ ve to seven years. Little is 
known about the eﬀ ects of anticorruption assistance. Th ere has as of 
yet been no regional study of the broad eﬀ ects of projects and the 
structures of power and interests that are aﬀ ected by these. By assessing 
these eﬀ ects, we hope to learn why “tangible” results in the ﬁ ght against 
corruption have yet to be forthcoming, and whether this lack of results 
is problematic and possibly counter-productive, or simply indicative of 
the long-term nature of anticorruption reform.  
For this study, the Soros Foundations Network and the Center 
for Policy Studies commissioned an overview of donor-supported 
anticorruption projects in four Southeastern European countries—
namely Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria and Macedonia. 
Th e selection does not aim to provide a comprehensive analysis of all 
anticorruption projects in the countries observed.  We chose to focus 
on projects implemented by diﬀ erent donors, with diﬀ erent mandates, 
but strove to concentrate on the similarities between the projects, 
rather than their diﬀ erences. We sought not to evaluate donors or their 
projects, but rather to understand the paradigm that has developed 
in anticorruption assistance in Southeastern Europe. Donors largely 
developed their thinking on anticorruption assistance from examples 
drawn from the transition region, which was the ﬁ rst region where 
anticorruption projects were implemented in 1996/97. We believe 
our analysis in Southeastern Europe will further our understanding of 
anticorruption assistance in the transition region as a whole, and where 
relevant, will help shed light on donor-supported projects to ﬁ ght 
corruption in other parts of the world as well.   
In all countries, we started by making an inventory of signiﬁ cant 
(in terms of budget) donor supported anticorruption projects. From 
the pool of these projects, we selected ﬁ ve that included the larger 
civil society and institutional reform projects implemented, as well 
Little is known about the 
effects of anticorruption 
assistance
  C E N T E R  F O R  P O L I C Y  S T U D I E S  —  P O L I C Y  S T U D I E S  S E R I E S
16
as national anticorruption strategies and accompanying governmental 
structures and policies speciﬁ cally geared to ﬁ ghting corruption. 
Further, in all countries we selected one project sponsored by the 
Soros Foundations Network. Th is methodology was designed to 
choose a broadly representative selection, aiming to cover the diverse 
areas targeted by anticorruption. Research was mainly based on ﬁ eld 
interviews, conducted by local researchers responsible for writing 
up the ﬁ ve case studies pertaining to their respective countries. 
Researchers received training by the CEU Center for Policy Studies and 
a methodological questionnaire to ﬁ ll out which served as the backbone 
for the case studies. Th e selection of the researchers was a determining 
factor in the project’s success. In each country we sought to select 
researchers who had not necessarily been professionally immersed in 
formulating anticorruption policy or implementing anticorruption 
reform, with the aim of bringing a fresh outlook to the ﬁ eld. 
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I .  A S S E S S I N G  A N T I C O R R U P T I O N  A S S I S TA N C E
 I N  S O U T H E A S T E R N  E U R O P E
A .  B u i l d i n g  U p  t h e  D e m a n d  f o r  R e f o r m :  
 C i v i l  S o c i e t y  P r o j e c t s
1. Assumptions
We start our analysis by looking at the assumptions behind the projects, 
in order to reconstruct the rationale behind them and to see how their 
implementation and results live up to initial expectations. Th e paper 
does not seek to argue that the designers of anticorruption projects 
in Southeastern Europe had, at the very start, unrealistic expectations 
regarding the possible impact of civil society activity on corruption. 
Alone, civil society activities could not hope to aﬀ ect corruption, but 
are one element of recipes for successful reform that include other 
factors such as the need to increase political accountability, create a 
competitive private sector, strengthen institutional restraints on power 
and improve public sector management.3
Th e assumptions listed below describe the mechanism through 
which donors and project designers believed civil society could have an 
impact on the phenomenon of corruption at all, provided that other 
factors were also in place. It was assumed that civil society activities 
were a powerful pressure mechanism, part of a process that could yield 
tangible results in the short, medium and long term. Before looking 
at the relation between civil society activities and broader reform 
processes, our initial focus is on the means through which donors 
sought to promote the involvement of local civil society groups in the 
ﬁ ght against corruption.
3 See www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/index.cfm.
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Th e anticorruption initiatives involving civil society that we 
analyzed shared four common assumptions,4 namely that:
• civil society pressure can have some degree of inﬂ uence on 
government decisions, even in the case of a corrupt or unwilling 
government;
• there is a common understanding between the donors and 
recipients of aid (government, civil society organizations, the 
public) on the nature of corruption; and that there is a common 
understanding between the donors and the aid recipients on the 
measures necessary to ﬁ ght corruption;
• corruption is a nonpartisan issue, i.e. that all civil society groups, 
from NGOs to the private sector, and all citizens share an interest 
in a corruption-free environment; and
• knowledge of the levels and eﬀ ects of corruption will motivate 
citizens to actively ﬁ ght corruption.
Th e ﬁ rst assumption posits that a government oﬃ  cial, if confronted 
with enough public pressure, might overcome the beneﬁ ts of corruption 
and choose to follow the public’s demands. Th e assumption implies 
that the government is representative enough of the public in order for 
the public to yield power over it, or that popular dissatisfaction with 
the government’s policies will trigger reactions by other players (donor 
community, international community, EC, NATO) who will yield 
power over the government. Th e underlying idea is that politicians are 
4 Th is chapter is based on the analysis of the following projects: In Albania, Reducing 
Corruption in Albania (Albanian Coalition against Corruption), supported by 
USAID; in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Anticorruption Campaign “Nadglasajte 
Korupciju,” supported by the OSCE in the run-up to the November 2000 general 
elections, Transparency International BiH’s Corruption Perceptions Index and 
the Open Society Fund—Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Social Eﬀ ects of Investigative 
Journalism; in Bulgaria, Coalition 2000, supported by USAID, as well as “Monitoring 
the Privatization of the Bulgarian Telecom,” supported by USAID and implemented 
by Transparency International Bulgaria; and in Macedonia, the Culture of Law versus 
Corruption project, supported by the European Initiative for Democracy and Human 
Rights (EU), and the Macedonia Corruption Free Coalition, supported by the 
Foundation for an Open Society Macedonia. 
The assumption implies 
that the government is 
representative enough of the 
public in order for the public to 
yield power over it
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rational actors interested in re-election, which makes them responsive 
to public demands and preferences.  
On the civil society side, it is assumed that civil society groups are 
close enough to the public to have appeal and be broadly representative. 
Projects in the region also generally took for granted that the beneﬁ ts 
of cooperating with the government would far outweigh the costs 
of directly confronting it. Most of the civil society projects that we 
analyzed adopted a non-confrontational and cooperative position 
towards the government. All coalitions of NGOs that we analyzed 
such as Coalition 2000 in Bulgaria or the Albanian Coalition against 
Corruption purported not to directly confront the government. 
Civil society groups were rarely openly confrontational towards the 
government. 
Th e second assumption posits that there is a common, uncontested 
understanding of the nature of corruption and of the measures that are 
necessary to ﬁ ght it, which is shared by donors, civil society groups and 
the public at large. Corruption is seen as the single greatest obstacle 
to economic and social development. It undermines development by 
distorting the rule of law and weakening the institutional foundation on 
which economic growth depends. Corruption has the most deleterious 
eﬀ ect on the poor, and sabotages policies that aim to reduce poverty. 
Corruption is also portrayed as a grave ﬂ aw of the political system 
that undermines the legitimacy of elected oﬃ  cials and the democratic 
process in general. Th e public is encouraged to view corruption as a 
cause for all major problems aﬀ ecting transitional societies—from 
economic diﬃ  culties, to social injustice issues and dissatisfaction with 
the performance of the democratic institutions. 
Further, the assumption posits that there exists a standardized list of 
measures to ﬁ ght corruption (listed above), among which an active civil 
society able to put pressure on the government is a component part. 
Anticorruption experts advise government on anticorruption policies 
which are implemented thanks to political will and public support. 
Provided that both of these are in place, not only will corruption be 
It is assumed that civil society 
groups are close enough to the 
public to have appeal and be 
broadly representative
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reduced, but also there will be visible improvements in the broader set 
of problems which corruption causes, including economic underachieve-
ment, social injustice, and the deﬁ ciencies of the democratic process.
Th e third assumption posits that all civil society groups—from 
NGOs to the private sector—and all citizens share an interest in a 
corruption-free environment. Since the costs of corruption fall upon 
everyone, ﬁ ghting against it transcends political or ethnic divisions. 
Donors saw corruption as a cross-cutting issue that could mobilize 
broad coalitions of interests. 
In our examples, coalitions of NGOs allied to ﬁ ght corruption 
recruited participating organizations from a wide section of the civil 
society sector. Th e Albanian Coalition against Corruption, at its 
early peak in 2001 included a range of groups spanning think tanks, 
community service organizations, education and media groups, as 
well as private sector businesses. Coalition 2000 in Bulgaria included 
MPs, judges, NGOs and representatives from the business sector on 
its steering committee. Th e Macedonian Coalition drew together 
unemployment associations as well as youth groups. 
Th e last assumption is that civil society actors and, more generally, 
the population at large are either unaware of corruption or aware of it 
but tolerate it because they do not have the necessary understanding 
of its true causes and consequences. Once they have been given this 
information they will be motivated to form a constituency that will 
challenge the government’s record on transparency, accountability and 
integrity. 
Most civil society projects in the countries that we analyzed 
included a public education component, at least in their earlier stages 
where, as part of a broader public awareness campaign, citizens were 
informed about the causes and consequences of corruption.
In Bosnia in 2000, the OSCE promoted an anticorruption campaign 
in the run-up to the elections in order to shift the debate away from 
partisan rhetoric to the consequences of corruption (unemployment, 
privatization, nepotism, economic fraud, etc.). 
The assumption posits that 
all civil society groups and all 
citizens share an interest in a 
corruption-free environment
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Th e projects we analyzed sought to build public constituencies 
backing anticorruption reform. Th ey did this through raising awareness 
of the ills of corruption by publishing information on its causes and 
consequences and thus going beyond the public’s original toleration of 
the problem and skepticism as to whether it could be fought against. 
In so doing, civil society projects published regular surveys on the 
level and loci of corruption, usually based on public perceptions of 
corruption. Th e projects thus implied that corruption perceptions 
provide an adequate guide to the real level of corruption in a country.
2. Instruments
Anticorruption Coalitions 
A template has emerged in the Southeastern European region, for 
large, donor-funded anticorruption coalitions. In addition to sharing 
and following the assumptions mentioned above, these coalitions share 
a set of common characteristics.
Coalitions usually include:
• A steering committee composed of a broad section of NGOs, 
deciding on the strategic direction of the coalition;
• Regular public meetings;
• An action plan or policy framework to deal with corruption, to 
provide recommendations to the government and to inﬂ uence their 
own work;
• A “small grants” program for the coalition to implement part of 
the action plan, for the coalition to support its objectives, build its 
sustainability and develop local civil society capacity. 
Th e coalitions we analyzed all sought to achieve as broad an appeal 
as possible by recruiting members from the NGO community, think 
tanks, research institutes, the media and business. Th e coalitions were 
both broad in scope and large in size. Th e Albanian Coalition against 
Corruption for example numbered up to 180 members, and the 
A template has emerged in 
the Southeastern European 
region, for large, donor-funded 
anticorruption coalitions
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Macedonian Corruption Free Coalition recruited up to 80 members. 
In Albania and in Bulgaria, these were the two largest civil society 
projects ever to be implemented in those countries, both with multi-
million dollar budgets. 
In all cases, the coalitions adopted a non-confrontational stance 
towards government.5 Th eir ultimate aims were both to raise awareness 
of the problem, and to put themselves in a situation where they could 
work together with government to overcome it. In order to succeed in 
this latter aim, the coalitions had to be sustainable in time, to both see 
the reforms through and apply constant pressure. 
Th e size and breadth of coalition activities meant that the larger 
coalitions included most of the other instruments laid out in this 
section. Coalition 2000 had a heavier focus on research, ACAC on civil 
society capacity building, and the Macedonian coalition on awareness. 
In common, they shared a focus on getting government to enact and 
follow through on anticorruption reform, whether through pressure, 
expert help or by providing data on the nature of corruption.6 In this 
paper, we focus on their similarities.
Monitoring Groups / Watchdogs
Monitoring or watchdog groups seek inconsistencies in the govern-
ment’s application of the law, and expose them to the public with 
the aim of forcing the government to react. Like anticorruption 
coalitions, the monitoring groups aimed to be sustainable in order to 
provide a constant means of pressure on the government. For example, 
in Bulgaria in 2000, the local Transparency International chapter 
monitored the privatization of the Bulgarian Telecom Company. 
5 Th e terms of reference of the USAID-funded Albanian Coalition against Corruption 
explicitly mentioned that the coalition should adopt a non-confrontational stance 
towards government. 
6 Th e larger coalitions in Bulgaria and Albania were akin to lobbying groups.
F R O M  T H E  G R O U N D  U P  
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Th e project’s rationale was that the high public proﬁ le of the project 
(through a well-publicized campaign in the media) would cast suﬃ  cient 
light on the telecom’s privatization for the government to be forced into 
conducting it transparently, rather than risk bearing the cost of public 
and international condemnation. 
Anticorruption Awareness Campaigns 
An anticorruption campaign uses a combination of media and advertis-
ing instruments to promote awareness of the ﬁ ght against corruption 
at a particular, strategic point in time. Th ey can also use street theater, 
public meetings, radio discussion programs, phone-ins, poster and 
essay competitions, or other similar methods. 
Th e OSCE launched an anticorruption campaign in the run-up 
to the 2000 elections in Bosnia. Th e OSCE’s aim was to increase the 
voters’ knowledge about the causes and consequences of corruption 
in order for corruption to become an issue in the elections. Th e cam-
paign thought to appeal to a broad cross-section of the population by 
publishing 200,000 educational brochures in Bosnian newspapers, 
posting television and radio spots in the run-up to the elections and large 
billboards at the entrances of major cities encouraging citizens to take a 
stand against corruption with the lettering: “Vote Corruption Away.”
Surveys of the Level or Loci of Corruption
In our case studies, civil society groups presented themselves as the main 
local purveyors of surveys detailing the extent or loci of corruption in 
their country. Th e surveys ﬁ lled an informational purpose—better 
information for donors in formulating their anticorruption 
strategies—as well as a public awareness purpose; the launch of surveys 
coinciding with large-scale awareness campaigns being undertaken by 
those groups. In Bulgaria, Coalition 2000 published regular quarterly 
surveys on the extent and loci of corruption in the country via the 
implementing NGO, the Center for the Study of Democracy. 
An anticorruption campaign 
uses a combination of media 
and advertising instruments 
to promote awareness 
of the fi ght against corruption 
at a particular, strategic 
point in time
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NGOs published surveys on the perceived levels of corruption across 
diﬀ erent state sectors or within a particular sector in order to encourage 
concerned institutions to respond to their ﬁ ndings. In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, the local Transparency International chapter published 
a survey of corruption in Bosnia in 2002 presenting Bosnian citizens’ 
perceptions of corruption across diﬀ erent state sectors. Th e report 
created a strong reaction on the part of the media and forced concerned 
state agencies to react. Th e Center for the Study of Democracy utilized 
the same strategy by publishing annual corruption assessment reports 
listing the most corrupt institutions in the country. For example, in 
2000, the judiciary was ranked “most corrupt institution.” At the time 
of study, in 2003, universities topped the list.  
Technical Assistance Tools
In addition to widespread media campaigns and well-publicized survey 
work, groups relied on roundtables, conferences and workshops, both 
in the capital cities and local communities to sensitize the public and 
the NGO community to anticorruption work, and provided training 
to interested NGOs through workshops and training seminars. 
3. Objectives
Regardless of size, country or donor, all civil society projects that we 
analyzed shared one or more of the following objectives:
• To increase transparency and accountability in government 
through public pressure
 One of the primary objectives of civil society projects was to create 
counterparts to government that would lobby and apply pressure on 
government to increase measures of transparency and accountability. 
• To raise public awareness
 Raising public awareness of the eﬀ ects and causes of corruption 
was a central element of civil society’s role in the ﬁ ght against 
F R O M  T H E  G R O U N D  U P  
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corruption. Th e largest amounts of funds were channelled towards 
large-scale campaigns in the media, advertising and door to door 
canvassing, workshops and conferences in the capital cities as 
well as in the countryside. Th e campaigns aimed to build consti-
tuencies that would directly pressure the government to implement 
anticorruption reform, hold the government to account and give 
civil society the necessary credibility and legitimacy for the groups 
to be taken seriously. Th e awareness campaigns built those cons-
tituencies by providing information to the public on the nature and 
causes of corruption, in order to motivate the public to take action 
and support reform rather than tolerate corruption. 
• To develop the capacity of civil society 
 – By encouraging civil society groups to launch anticorruption projects
  In Macedonia in one of the very ﬁ rst projects speciﬁ cally 
on corruption in the country, the Culture of Law versus 
Corruption project, teams were sent to local communities in 
Macedonia where local NGOs, as well as the public, learned 
about corruption and its eﬀ ects. In order for the NGOs to 
be able to launch public awareness campaigns educating the 
public, the NGOs had to themselves be trained in the ﬁ rst 
place. Th e larger coalition projects in Albania and Bulgaria 
included small grants programs which were intended to reach 
local communities that could not be easily reached by working 
from the capital city, as well as providing training to those 
NGOs to perform their new tasks.
 – By encouraging dialogue between civil society and the government 
on anticorruption
  A more ambitious aim for these projects was to develop civil 
society’s capacity to such a degree that it could engage the 
government on the topic, and provide the government with 
additional expert help and recommendations. 
  Th e Albanian Coalition’s core objective was to raise civil 
society’s standing to a degree where it could enter into dialogue 
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with the government and be taken seriously. In order to do this, 
civil society groups ﬁ rst had to have a much better knowledge 
and understanding of corruption and its diﬀ erent forms, before 
it could engage the government in a meaningful way. Th e entire 
ﬁ rst year of the Albanian coalition was devoted to civil society 
groups working out their priorities and goals, and the activities 
they would undertake to achieve them. Th e culmination of 
that eﬀ ort was an action plan to ﬁ ght corruption drafted by 
the Coalition members themselves. Th anks to the plan, ACAC 
members would then be in a position to provide policy advice 
to the government on the implementation of the Albanian 
National Strategy against Corruption. 
• To provide expert help to the government
 Th e projects aimed to set up the necessary structural relations 
for government to cooperate with civil society in drafting and 
implementing anticorruption legislation. 
 – By the government participating in civil society activities
  In Bulgaria, members of parliament as well as representatives 
from state institutions sat on the Coalition 2000’s steering 
committee. State oﬃ  cials from diﬀ erent ministries were invited 
to working groups to debate the relative advantages of a range 
of best practices in the ﬁ ght against corruption. 
 – By civil society inﬂ uencing / participating in the government’s 
decision-making process
  Coalition 2000, ACAC and the Macedonian Coalition against 
Corruption all issued action plans or guidelines to ﬁ ght cor-
ruption with the aim to expand and inﬂ uence the government’s 
policy options. In the case of ACAC, the coalition successfully 
lobbied the government for one of their members to have a seat 
on the board monitoring the implementation of the national 
anticorruption strategy.  
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4. Eﬀ ects
Donors found it diﬃ  cult to qualify the impact of a project on a 
phenomenon like corruption, which is diﬃ  cult to measure and 
where any attempt at measurement can be inﬂ uenced by a number of 
extraneous factors. In response, donors developed indicators or proxies 
of success, to qualify and seek to quantify the eﬀ ects of their projects. 
Projects considered as successes—which include the quasi-totality 
of projects that we analyzed—were found to have one or all of the 
following eﬀ ects:
• an increase in the awareness of corruption;
• creation of new structures to ﬁ ght corruption; and/or
• strengthening of the capacity of civil society.
Th ese proxies can only be taken as true measures of the impact of 
given projects, if the assumptions listed above are veriﬁ ed. In no case 
was there a deep analysis of the impact of a project, based on an analysis 
of the assumptions behind it, or its broad eﬀ ects, both intended and 
unintended. In our research, we sought to develop a deeper level of 
project analysis.
Before assessing the general eﬀ ects of anticorruption assistance, we 
stop to consider the eﬀ ects of anticorruption coalitions, the largest of 
all civil society projects implemented in Southeastern Europe.
 
Building the Demand for Reform: 
Th e Eﬀ ects of Anticorruption Coalitions
Coalitions succeeded in raising public awareness of the importance of 
corruption as a political and policy issue, a signiﬁ cant obstacle to the 
economic and social development of a country and the legitimacy of 
its political process. For example, Coalition 2000 in Bulgaria to a large 
extent changed the political discourse of the country, forced political 
actors to respond to the issue of corruption, and managed to position 
Coalitions succeeded in raising 
public awareness of the 
importance of corruption 
as a political and policy issue
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itself as a repository of expert knowledge on anticorruption measures. 
Yet, Coalition 2000 and the other coalitions we analyzed failed to gain 
broad backing from either civil society or from the public at large. 
Th ey failed to create a broad, nonpartisan anticorruption constituency 
or anticorruption movement. In their early stages, they succeeded in 
uniting a wide spectrum of nongovernmental organizations, but this 
initial success was not sustainable and failed to translate into more 
meaningful, long-term collective actions. In the case of Coalition 2000, 
the organization gradually evolved as a high-proﬁ le expertise-providing 
think tank or lobbying group for the adoption of legislative measures 
designed to curb corruption.  
Neither Broad nor Sustainable
Th e coalitions failed to inspire the type of cross-cutting, universal 
appeal that they had intended to generate in the ﬁ rst place. Most of the 
coalitions started strongly in their ﬁ rst months or year of existence. Th e 
Albanian Coalition against Corruption quickly enlisted 180 NGOs to 
its name, early meetings and working groups were well attended and 
media coverage was strong. However, one year after its creation, in 
March 2002, only 30% of the coalition members were present for the 
election of the coalition’s powerful steering committee. Th e ﬁ rst year of 
the coalition’s existence was meant to consolidate the base which would 
ensure its future and long lasting standing vis a vis government. In their 
early stages, the coalitions all attracted a fairly representative sample 
of their countries’ NGO sector. But once the initial bout of exposure 
and grant money was expended, NGO interest waned. Th e same broad 
pattern is true of Coalition 2000 as well as the Macedonian Corruption 
Free Coalition. In most cases, the coalition either regrouped around 
one central organizing NGO, as in Bulgaria and in Macedonia, or 
around its steering committee, as was the case in Albania. 
Th e broad coalitions of interests that the coalitions purported to 
represent failed to materialize. Strikingly, attempts to attract business 
groups’ support for their project failed to succeed in all three cases. Th e 
The coalitions failed 
to inspire the type of 
cross-cutting, universal appeal 
that they had intended to 
generate in the fi rst place
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ACAC made special attempts to attract the private sector but failed 
to present convincing evidence of a common interest between them 
and the NGOs. Private sector delegates involved in the coalition were 
likely to beneﬁ t more from the exposure and contacts with government 
that the project aﬀ orded them rather than from the achievement of the 
coalition’s mission. Th ere was thus no real incentive for businesses to 
participate. 
Coalitions Seen as Too Close to Government 
Th e coalitions failed to be suﬃ  ciently close to and representative of 
the public to gain its trust. In Albania and Bulgaria, the coalitions 
were seen as being too close to distrusted governments for the public 
to trust them. In Albania in particular, the problem was compounded 
by the public’s broadly negative perception of the country’s weak, 
donor-dependent civil society actors. All the while, the coalitions did 
not succeed in exerting any meaningful inﬂ uence over governmental 
policy. 
Th e coalition’s non-confrontational approach towards government 
sat uneasily with their mandate as a public pressure group. Th e public 
distrusted them, and challenged their claim to enjoy a broad and 
representational backing. Th e coalitions were left adrift resembling 
lobbying groups, albeit without a clear constituency as to what they 
were to be lobbying for.  
Despite initial declarations of intentions, the coalitions were to a 
greater or lesser degree politicized, or at least perceived as such by the 
public. All coalitions were accused of being too close to government. 
Th e Macedonian Corruption Free Coalition stands out. Th e coalition’s 
campaign succeeded in energizing the Macedonian political debate in 
the run-up to the elections. Voter turnout, at 74%, was a contemporary 
Balkan record. Th e project’s clear, if implied, focus on the elections 
made it a success. However, the focus may have contributed to its early 
demise, as it became closely associated with the new party in power 
and its head went on to become the head of the newly created State 
The coalition’s 
non-confrontational approach 
towards government sat 
uneasily with their mandate 
as a public pressure group
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Commission against Corruption. Th e coalition may well have been 
genuinely independent, but was not seen that way in the eyes of the 
public. Since the coalition was meant to garner widespread civil society 
and public support in the long term, this matters. 
Awareness and Expectations Go Up 
Civil society coalitions, public awareness campaigns and monitoring 
projects successfully contributed to increasing the visibility of corrup-
tion as a problem in the Balkans. Corruption went from being one of 
many problems to being the most serious problem facing the region. 
References to corruption increased in the media and political debates, 
and were used by donors to justify the success of their programs.7 
Both coalitions and awareness campaigns were instrumental for the 
dissemination of a speciﬁ c view of the nature and the negative eﬀ ects 
of corruption on society, and its repercussions on economic and social 
development. 
None of the projects that we analyzed sought to examine the 
impact of increased public awareness of corruption on governmental 
policies, and eventually, on the reduction of corruption. Projects that 
intended not solely to raise awareness, but to pressure the government 
into accepting reforms or to issue recommendations to the government, 
might have failed in their core objectives, but were seen as successful 
in that they contributed to an increase in the public’s awareness of 
corruption. 
In the case of the aforementioned monitoring by the local TI 
chapter of the Bulgarian Telecom Company, the government accepted 
the monitoring oﬀ er, but subsequently refused to grant TI the necessary 
access to information or meetings. TI publicly withdrew from the 
deal claiming that transparency standards were not being met. Th e 
7 Th e TI monitoring project in Bulgaria, the TI index in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and the Macedonian Corruption Free Coalition all refer to increased visibility of 
corruption in the media and references made to their respective projects in the media 
as a sign of success. 
None of the projects that we 
analyzed sought to examine 
the impact of increased public 
awareness of corruption on 
governmental policies
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project did not contribute to any visible change in the government’s 
privatization policy, yet the project was seen as greatly successful. Its 
main eﬀ ect was increasing public awareness of the lack of transparency 
in state company privatizations. 
For lack of evaluation, beyond the broad assertion that public 
awareness and related high-proﬁ le campaigns increased the visibility of 
corruption as a topic in day to day public and political discourse, little 
is known of their eﬀ ects.
Creation of New Structures (NGO or Governmental) 
and Legislation to Fight Corruption
Donors referred to the creation of new structures as well as legislation 
to ﬁ ght corruption, as a practical outcome, a positive “tangible” result 
of their civil society projects and as an indicator of success.
New Legislation
Civil society projects reported some of their greatest achievements in 
their successful lobbying for pieces of legislation. Most notably, the 
Albanian coalition successfully lobbied for a law on declaration of 
assets by politicians and state oﬃ  cials, which was branded as one of 
the coalitions’ largest successes to date. Th e law was at ﬁ rst opposed by 
the government, but subsequently passed in part due to the coalition’s 
pressure, as well as that of the board monitoring the country’s national 
anticorruption strategy (on which the coalition has a seat). Yet it is 
monitoring the eﬀ ective implementation of the law rather than resting 
content with its enactment by the council of ministers that matters, 
and governments in the region have a poor record of implementation. 
Coalitions did succeed in lobbying for speciﬁ c pieces of 
legislation. In Bulgaria, Coalition 2000 is credited for pushing for the 
implementation of the ombudsman law. Civil society projects were 
broadly successful in establishing “dialogue” between civil society and 
the governmental apparatus. Th eir impact on shaping public policy 
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cannot be denied. In all cases, however, the impact of civil society 
groups fell far below the expectations of the public concerning the 
necessity of dramatic changes in public governance—in terms of 
personnel and policies—necessary to address corruption meaningfully. 
Public awareness campaigns had strengthened the public’s perception 
that deep changes were needed to reform an essentially corrupt political 
system. In comparison, the “minor” victories scored by civil society 
organizations lost their signiﬁ cance, rapidly leading to disillusionment 
with anticorruption civil society work, and falling trust in coalitions 
and other civil society actors. Paradoxically, bodies created to mobilize 
and lead the public ended up marginalized and distrusted.
Th e legislation created by the civil society projects was seen as a 
success chieﬂ y by the civil society groups that had pushed for it. Th eir 
achievement was to have successfully lobbied government to adopt the 
law, rather than the implementation of the law itself. Since it is mostly 
too early to judge whether the laws they pressed for will be implemented 
or not, their main eﬀ ect so far has been to strengthen the capacity of 
civil society by engaging it in dialogue with the government.
New Structures: Citizens’ Advocacy Oﬃ  ce
Structures facilitating citizens’ day to day contact with government 
were by far the most popular reforms pressed for by civil society groups. 
In Albania, the Citizen’s Advocacy Oﬃ  ce (CAO) that was created at 
the behest of the Albanian coalition was extremely popular with its 
users. Th e oﬃ  ce provided citizens who were victims of extortion 
with free legal advice and help in following up on their complaint 
with the general prosecutor if necessary. An arrangement between 
the oﬃ  ce of the general prosecutor, the citizen’s advocacy oﬃ  ce and 
the Minister of State (in charge of the Albanian National Strategy to 
Fight Corruption) facilitated that follow-up. Th e oﬃ  ce was a popular 
success. Two thousand complaints were ﬁ led since its opening and it 
is universally seen by detractors and supporters alike as the coalition’s 
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greatest achievement. Its results were immediate, and could be felt and 
witnessed by all.
Strengthening the Capacity of Civil Society Groups
Th e clearest eﬀ ect of the civil society projects analyzed was often precisely 
their beneﬁ t to strengthening civil society organizations. In particular, 
anticorruption coalitions strengthened the NGO community in their 
respective countries. 
At a time when large donors are progressively withdrawing from 
the region, and thus depriving NGOs that developed by serving as 
providers of services (technical assistance, etc.) to the donor community 
from their means of employment, the new focus on anticorruption 
came as a welcome reprieve. Th e money spent and ideas promoted on 
anticorruption reform helped the Balkan NGO community to reinvent 
itself from service providers to advocacy and lobbying groups. 
Macedonian NGOs beneﬁ ted from education on the criminal code 
and diﬀ erent types of corruption during the run-up to the Macedonian 
elections; Albanian NGOs beneﬁ ted from expert help on a range of 
diﬀ erent topics in the ﬁ rst year of the Albanian coalition; media groups 
were supported by all coalitions, and many more. Yet NGOs’ move 
into the policy arena has so far failed to heighten public trust in them. 
A recent survey by the International IDEA in Bulgaria found that only 
10% of the public had trust in NGOs.8 
Th e relative lack of importance given to small grants to local NGOs 
by both the ACAC and the Coalition 2000 projects is surprising given 
the clear beneﬁ t incurred to local NGOs.  Some 12.5% of ACAC’s 
total budget and 15% of Coalition 2000’s budget for 1999 and 2000 
were spent on small grants. In both cases, the grants were many and 
small in size (in the low tens of thousands), giving vent to public 
criticism that the grant money would have been better spent had the 
8 South East Europe (SEE) Public Agenda Survey. http://www.idea.int/balkans/survey_
detailed.cfm.
The clearest effect of the civil 
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grants been larger and more focused. Th e Citizen’s Advocacy Oﬃ  ce was 
the ACAC’s largest success, and also its largest grant. 
Th roughout the civil society projects we analyzed, the high 
visibility of the topic together with astute advocacy strategies combined 
to increase the proﬁ le of the NGO sector and make it desirable for 
the government to be seen to cooperate. Whether the government was 
ready to give ground or not, the projects contributed to a strengthening 
of civil society’s standing vis a vis the government. 
In Albania, the government’s anticorruption matrix included 
elements of the ACAC’s action plan to ﬁ ght corruption. Civil society 
was seen to have scored a success by lobbying successfully for the law on 
the declaration of assets of politicians, by having one of the members of 
the coalition sit on the board monitoring the national anticorruption 
plan, and by engaging the general prosecutor and the Minister of State 
to cooperate with the Citizen’s Advocacy Oﬃ  ce in following up on 
citizen reports of corruption. Regardless of the overall outcome of the 
project, these alone must be regarded as a successful achievement in a 
relatively weak Albanian civil society context. 
High-proﬁ le projects enabled NGO actors to build a niche for them-
selves in a congested NGO market. In Bulgaria, the local TI chapter’s 
monitoring of the privatization of the Bulgarian telecom established 
the chapter as an inﬂ uential voice in public policy. Th e same was true 
for high-proﬁ le NGO projects throughout the countries we surveyed. 
5. Underlying Problems
Anticorruption Coalitions are Problematic
It was possible to create various discrete activities but no genuine 
coalitions. As an informal movement, to gather general backing 
behind the concepts of transparency and accountability, the coalitions’ 
awareness campaigns may have succeeded (see next section). As 
physical expressions of that movement directly campaigning on such a 
broad and political issue, they failed. 
It was possible to create 
various discrete activities but 
no genuine coalitions
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“Most of the Bulgarian NGOs are not ready for coalitions; real 
partnership,” aﬃ  rmed an NGO member of Coalition 2000, reﬂ ecting 
on the many departures from the coalition. Th e real question is not 
whether Bulgarian NGOs were suited to coalitions, but whether 
corruption as a theme was. 
Th e broad, all-purpose serving shape of coalitions suited the 
conceptualization of corruption as promoted by the donor community: 
a broad, overarching developmental problem with causes and con-
sequences spanning a range of diﬀ erent reform areas, but was ill-suited 
to creating lasting public movements for change. 
Th e coalitions’ inﬂ uence was not great enough to pressure govern-
ment into commitment to the type of large-scale anticorruption reform 
that they had envisaged. Th ere was a discrepancy between the type of 
reforms that coalitions built up a demand for (large-scale, radical, 
immediate) and the type of long-term, institutional solutions that 
governments were prepared to oﬀ er, or prepared to pay lip service to.   
Th e coalitions’ success in inﬂ uencing the policy agenda was limited 
by external factors (weak institutional capacity to implement reforms, 
lack of political will), compounded by the fact that the coalitions failed 
to translate into the type of long-term societal movements that they 
were designed to be. Coalitions failed to build broad, sustainable, non-
political anticorruption constituencies. Th e coalitions failed to build up 
the necessary public support behind a long-term anticorruption reform 
agenda, but rather contributed to whipping up the public’s desire to see 
the corrupt be punished.
Public Awareness Raising
Public awareness projects raised the proﬁ le of corruption as a public 
and political topic in the Balkans, however, strikingly little additional 
detail is available beyond that assertion. Donors accepted an increased 
public awareness of corruption as a positive good, without delving 
deeper to analyze whether their own objectives were met. 
The broad, all-purpose serving 
shape of coalitions was 
ill-suited to creating lasting 
public movements for change
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Th e original aim of public awareness campaigns was not simply to 
elevate corruption to the rank of public concern, but to ensure that a 
better understanding of corruption would encourage the public to no 
longer tolerate corruption, give less bribes and resist extortion. For lack 
of evaluation, it is impossible to know whether this objective was met. 
Neither is it possible to assess the extent to which the public adhered to 
the deﬁ nition of corruption and its consequences that was publicized 
by the donors and projects. 
Th e OSCE’s anticorruption campaign in Bosnia argued for an 
economic deﬁ nition of the consequences of corruption. Th at deﬁ nition 
might have succeeded in getting the public’s and the politicians’ 
attention in the run-up to the election, but there is no evidence that 
this was the deﬁ nition of corruption that was used in the political 
debate that ensued. 
If we do not know whether the awareness projects empowered the 
citizens by changing or reﬁ ning their understanding of corruption, it is 
hard to evaluate their impact on the political debate. 
We Do Not Know the Type of Constituency that Was Created
Public awareness campaigns created a general desire on the part of the 
public for the government to be seen to curb corruption. In Bulgaria, 
following the 2001 elections fought in part over the corruption issue, 
the government signalled to appease the newly created anticorruption 
constituency by implementing speciﬁ cally anticorruption reforms. But 
this was an anticorruption policy package recommended by the donor 
community (institutional reform, transparency measures).
Th e question remains whether this was what the newly created 
constituency expected. In many ways, the public’s demands were 
more drastic and immediate. Above all, the public demanded results. 
By building up the public at large’s awareness of the importance 
of corruption as a policy issue, those campaigns built up public 
expectations that corruption could be decreased in the short term.
Above all, the public 
demanded results
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Donors accounted for heightened public awareness of the importance 
of curbing corruption as a positive result without taking into account 
that their projects had created high public expectations for actual, 
tangible results in ﬁ ghting corruption. In the assessment of the eﬀ ects of 
public awareness campaigns there was no built-in check for the realistic 
potential of anticorruption measures to meet these expectations.
Risk that Corruption Should Supersede Other Problems 
Corruption has become one of the most popular (and populist) 
explanations for Balkan countries’ economic and political problems. It 
is seen as “the disease” rather than a symptom that the nation’s health 
is not what it should be. It might therefore be concluded that public 
awareness campaigns succeeded in dramatically inﬂ uencing the region’s 
policy discourse. Yet, shifting the discourse heavily in the direction 
of corruption bears its own costs. It shifts attention away from other 
problems which might be equally, if not more important than corruption 
per se, such as the stability and representativeness of the party systems, 
the cogency of party programs, etc., all of which can enhance standards 
of governance and ipso facto reduce levels of corruption. If public 
awareness raising is not followed by the government’s full commitment 
to implementing anticorruption reform, public awareness campaigns 
run the risk of not only unduly heightening public expectations of 
change, but also of monopolizing and stalling the wider policy debate. 
Conclusion: Did the Projects Strengthen Democracy 
in Southeastern Europe?
Returning to the original assumptions behind the projects, our 
analysis has shown three of the main assumptions to be problematic. 
Anticorruption did not prove to be such a broad, cross-cutting issue as 
donors had hoped, nor was the public so directly and constructively 
empowered by public awareness and information campaigns as was 
intended. Moreover, none of the projects that we analyzed demonstrated 
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the level of inﬂ uence over government policy that was expected of them. 
Since governments ultimately hold the key to successful anticorruption 
reform, this is worrying. 
Th e coalitions failed to be sustainable. Th e problem of sustainability 
aﬀ ects all civil society projects on anticorruption. If the government is to 
be under constant pressure from the public, as intended by the donors, 
the civil society groups catalyzing that pressure must be sustainable, 
and must be representative of public interests. So far, the groups have 
little sustainability beyond the donor-funding machine. Th e interests 
that the NGOs are responding to seem to be chieﬂ y those of the donor 
community.  If they are to shift public attitudes, civil society groups 
must respond to the interests and concerns of citizens rather than to 
donor interests and agendas.
Th e non-political approach to corruption favored by donors failed 
to produce a strong, nonpartisan anticorruption constituency, capable 
of being mobilized outside of the party politics channel. 
Mismatch Between the Donors’ Message and Public Demands
Th ere was a clear mismatch between the policy options that the donors 
intended the public to transmit to government, and the actual demands 
of the public. Th e donors intended the public to transmit a message of 
commitment to rooting out corruption to the government via in-depth 
institutional reforms, which are necessarily long-term. In contrast, the 
public’s demands were for a much more immediate, politicized and 
short-term response.   
Th e donors’ message may have been the right solution for the 
country’s economic development, but if there is a considerable lag 
between the public’s demands and the government’s response, there 
is a risk that public dissatisfaction should fast build up against the 
government, which in turn risks threatening democracy. Th ere is a 
need to agree on the goal of anticorruption projects—strengthening 
democracy or economic development? So far, a mixed message on the 
part of the donors has produced mixed results.   
There is a need to agree 
on the goal of anticorruption 
projects—strengthening 
democracy or economic 
development?
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B .  P r o v i d i n g  S o l u t i o n s  t o  G o v e r n m e n t :
 G o v e r n m e n t  O m n i b u s  P r o g r a m s
In this section we turn to the most prominent governmental response to 
the pressure by the donor community for the adoption of anticorruption 
measures in Southeastern Europe—comprehensive, omnibus programs 
to ﬁ ght corruption. We refer to the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development’s (EBRD) recent deﬁ nition of a governmental omni-
bus program as a coordinated assemblage of governmental structures 
and policies speciﬁ cally geared towards ﬁ ghting corruption.9 Th e 
donor community pressed for and supported the implementation 
of omnibus programs, while donor-supported civil society projects 
helped elaborate, implement and monitor their requirements. At the 
time of study, Albania and Bulgaria had well-established omnibus 
programs, Macedonia a burgeoning one, and Bosnia and Herzegovina 
had sought and failed to implement an omnibus program from 1999 to 
2001. Th e region’s programs have yet to be completed, yet an analysis 
of their early eﬀ ects is pressing as plans are currently being made to 
develop omnibus programs more broadly throughout the Southeastern 
European region.
1. Assumptions
Th e omnibus programs that we have analyzed share one basic assumption: 
that corruption needs to be tackled through a comprehensive set 
of institutional and legislative measures encompassing most of the 
jurisdictional areas of government. As indicated earlier, the assumption 
posits that there exists a standardized list of measures to ﬁ ght corruption 
9 Franklin Steves and Alan Rousso, Anti-corruption programmes in post-communist 
transition countries and changes in the business environment, 1999–2002, EBRD 
Working Paper No. 85.
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and that there is a common understanding between the donors and the 
aid recipients on those measures.
Th e underlying premise is that omnibus programs present a win-
win situation. If speciﬁ c actors within the government are reluctant 
to engage in the issue of anticorruption, the program will force the 
government as a whole to adopt a comprehensive set of anticorruption 
measures. Alternatively, if a newly elected government is keen to 
work in anticorruption but lacks direction, a well-crafted national 
anticorruption strategy and accompanying structures can infuse a 
sense of direction, coordinate institutional eﬀ orts and thus press for 
the eﬀ ective implementation of the laws. Omnibus programs are 
seen as universal tools in the ﬁ ght against corruption. Provided the 
institutional structure used to implement the strategy is well-adapted 
to the country context, countries beneﬁ t from a well-coordinated 
approach to the multiple / heteroclite reforms that together make up 
anticorruption policy. 
Th is chapter is chieﬂ y based on observations gathered in three 
case studies: the Council of Europe’s PACO I project in Albania, 
strengthening the anticorruption monitoring group; the Macedonian 
State Commission against Corruption’s national program for the ﬁ ght 
against corruption; and the Friedrich Naumann Stiftung’s national 
anticorruption strategy for Macedonia. 
2. Instruments
Omnibus anticorruption programs generally contain all or a selection 
of the following attributes:
• an anticorruption law;
• a national anticorruption strategy or program;
• a ministerial commission, specialized unit or dedicated agency;
• an action plan to implement the program; and/or
• a monitoring mechanism.
The underlying premise is 
that omnibus programs present 
a win-win situation
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Th e National Anticorruption Strategy and Action Plan
Th e guiding attribute within this broad set up is:
• Th e national anticorruption strategy, which sets priorities, co-
ordinates between diﬀ erent ministries and ensures implementa-
tion. Th e strategy provides for a wide range of diﬀ erent reforms. 
Some of the measures in the strategy seek to reduce the incentives 
for corruption in the institutional structures of the countries 
directly. Th ese include improved bribery laws, registers of the 
assets of politicians and the like. Other measures have a more 
indirect link with the issue of corruption: they try to improve the 
institutions of the countries in general, which presumably will 
help ﬁ ght corruption as well. Th ese measures include the setting 
up or the improvement of State Audit Oﬃ  ces, political party laws, 
customs reform laws and projects. 
• Th e Action Plan which operationalizes the strategy by distributing 
responsibility for the implementation of the reforms included in 
the strategy, accompanied by a matrix clearly laying out the order 
of implementation of reforms, together with the indicators used to 
measure it.
In Albania, the national anticorruption strategy and action plan 
were the product of two years of dialogue between the donor commu-
nity and the Albanian government, resulting in a strategic document 
spanning ﬁ ve reform areas, from public administration reform, 
improved legislation, improvement of public ﬁ nances management, 
better transparency in business transactions, to public information and 
civil society participation. 
In Macedonia, the national program to ﬁ ght corruption was 
elaborated by the recently created State Commission for the Fight 
against Corruption, in cooperation with civil society. Th e plan is 
equally broad ranging, but at the time of study had yet to be turned 
into an action plan approved by government. 
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Ministerial Commission / Anticorruption Monitoring Group 
Th e structure or agency overseeing the progress of the strategy is a 
determining factor in the strategy’s success. Th e onus is on the actual 
implementation of a clear and focused strategy by a strong institutional 
mechanism. Th e mechanism can either be an inter-ministerial com-
mission followed by a permanent anticorruption monitoring group, 
or a specially dedicated agency. International regulations are open 
to interpretation in this domain. Th e Council of Europe’s twenty 
principles in the ﬁ ght against corruption—the COE is a major source 
of expertise in anticorruption in the region—merely recommend “to 
promote the specialization of persons or bodies in charge of ﬁ ghting 
corruption and to provide them with appropriate means and training 
to perform their tasks.”10
In Albania, the Council of Europe, with funding from the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) set up a com-
prehensive institutional structure to monitor and support the imple-
mentation of the action plan. Th is structure includes:
• an anticorruption monitoring group (ACMG)—an expert group 
composed of the legal directors of relevant ministries as well as the 
Minister of State—to monitor the implementation of the plan, give 
advice and issue recommendations, and suggest improvement and 
prioritization of the plan,  
• and a permanent secretarial unit to the ACMG which provides 
administrative support, is responsible for the day to day implemen-
tation of the action plan, and follow-up with the diﬀ erent contact 
points which have been selected at relevant ministries. 
Th e Council of Europe’s approach is entirely focused on the 
implementation of the action plan. Th e institutional structures that 
have been created have no responsibility or powers beyond ensuring the 
implementation of the plan. 
10 Council of Europe Resolution (97) 24, on the twenty guiding principles for the ﬁ ght 
against corruption, http://cm.coe.int/ta/res/1997/97x24.htm.
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Dedicated Anticorruption Commission or Agency
In contrast to the latter example, strategies or action plans may be 
overseen by specially created anticorruption agencies with broader 
powers than the sole implementation of the action plan. 
Th e State Commission for the Fight against Corruption in 
Macedonia has responsibility for adopting and monitoring a national 
program for corruption prevention and repression (art 49, 1).  How-
ever, it also has the power to summon—in secret if necessary—persons 
suspected of corruption before the state commission in view of 
clarifying their position before possibly starting an initiative before 
the relevant bodies to discharge, replace or criminally prosecute those 
elected oﬃ  cials or public servants suspected of corruption (52,1 and 
49, 1). 
3. Eﬀ ects
Since the Macedonian national program to ﬁ ght corruption is relatively 
recent, this chapter focuses on the activities of the Albanian omnibus 
program. Th e Albanian omnibus program is the most advanced model 
developed in the region, and might serve as the inspiration for future 
omnibus programs in Southeastern Europe. Its eﬀ ects are relevant 
beyond Albania. 
Th e Council of Europe’s Programme against Corruption and 
organized crime in South Eastern Europe (PACO) project in Albania 
(PACO Albania) had a main objective and a long-term objective. Its 
long-term objective was to assist Albania in developing the rule of law, 
increase the possibility to attract foreign investment to the country 
and get closer to negotiations on the Stabilization and Association 
Agreements. Reducing corruption was not explicitly mentioned as an 
objective. Its main objective was to create a sustainable structure to 
monitor the implementation of the action plan and to strengthen the 
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cooperation of state institutions with the anticorruption monitoring 
group in order to implement the action plan. Research focused 
primarily on the ﬁ rst of these two main objectives. Since the research 
team was operating in Albania up until November 2003, comments 
will also tentatively broach the second objective. 
To Create a Sustainable Structure 
Th e structure governing the monitoring and reporting on the Albanian 
action plan is now in place.  A new board for the anticorruption 
monitoring group was successfully appointed, along with a permanent 
administrative unit, and contact points within the relevant ministries in 
order to facilitate the unit’s work were located.
Capacity Building
For each step, the Council of Europe (COE)—with the ﬁ nancial and 
expert assistance of the Swedish International Development Agency 
(SIDA)—provided technical assistance to all groups. In particular, the 
COE trained the permanent unit staﬀ  in monitoring, reporting and 
strategic planning in workshops also attended by the ministerial contact 
points and representatives of other independent state institutions 
(general prosecutor’s oﬃ  ce, ombudsman, etc.). Th e anticorruption 
action plan has been improved, the permanent unit staﬀ  trained to 
update it and the anticorruption monitor group has been tasked and 
trained to improve it on a regular basis. Th e implementation of the 
action plan is now part of a well-oiled bureaucratic system issuing 
yearly achievements indicators, based on which the action plan is 
updated and modiﬁ ed. 
Th ere is no doubt that the Albanian administration beneﬁ ted 
greatly from the training and is gaining valuable experience with 
strategic planning methods. 
The implementation of the 
action plan is now part of a 
well-oiled bureaucratic system
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Local Ownership
Th e permanent unit staﬀ  are young and motivated and supported by 
the oﬃ  ce of the Minister of State, which is equally dedicated to the 
task. Th e process is ﬁ rmly in Albanian hands. It is worth noting that 
the Council of Europe hired an Albanian project manager—now based 
in Strasbourg—to oversee the project which contributed to facilitating 
the communication and cooperation between the permanent unit, 
anticorruption monitoring group and the COE experts. 
Th e GRECO report on Albania in December 2002 highlighted 
this achievement, noting that “above all, the very creation of the 
anticorruption plan and the machinery for its implementation was 
highlighted as a great achievement in itself.”11 According to the 
project’s evaluation report conducted in February 2002, the virtues of 
the project design are the technical and material support envisaged for 
the support of the ACMG.
To Implement the National Anticorruption Action Plan
Achievements
At the time of study, the national anticorruption action plan had 
registered minor successes in passing and implementing legislation, 
but that so far lacked the momentum that might have been expected 
of such a well-publicized and overarching program. Th e Council of 
Ministers passed a law on a code of ethics in public administration as 
well as a law on the declaration of assets of public and elected oﬃ  cials; 
amongst others, laws on “notary” and on “advocacy” were passed in the 
judicial sector and a law on the “internal audit in the public service” 
was passed under the public ﬁ nance management heading. 
11 GRECO First evaluation round, evaluation report on Albania, para. 20, p.5. 
www.greco.coe.int.
The action plan lacked the 
momentum that might have 
been expected of such a 
well-publicized and 
overarching program
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Th e EC has been openly critical of the implementation of legislation, 
citing the lack of precision of the indicators used by the ACMG, lack 
of ﬁ rm deadlines and institutional cooperation, as well as poor quality 
of the requested measures in the draft action plan’s recommendations 
on legal consolidation. 
Informed observers have also criticized the permanent unit for 
not having the necessary governmental backing to be able to act as 
an eﬀ ective coordinating unit. Despite the selection of contact points 
at each of the relevant ministries, most of the institutions do not 
collaborate in gathering and exchanging information. 
Political Backing is Crucial
Th ese achievements pale in comparison with the task before them. Th e 
government has, for 2003–2004, given priority to civil service reform, 
public procurement reform, state police reform, and has pledged to 
eliminate corruption in the judiciary as well as to keep the public 
informed on these developments and cooperate with civil society. 
Th e structures that have been created will only succeed in making a 
dent in the mammoth task before them if they have political backing at 
the highest possible level, and enjoy public support to ensure that that 
backing remains.
Political and Public Backing Behind the Program
Civil Society
Cooperation with civil society has been fair given the relatively weak state 
of Albanian civil society. Th e USAID-sponsored Albanian Coalition 
against Corruption was given a seat on the board of the anticorruption 
monitoring group, and civil society groups contributed as experts in a 
small number of projects and surveys run by the permanent unit, not 
least in pushing for the adoption of the declaration of assets law. 
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Th e triangle commission—whereby the ACAC sponsored Citizen’s 
Advocacy Oﬃ  ce sends suspected corruption cases it has uncovered to 
the general prosecutor’s oﬃ  ce for follow up, with the help of the oﬃ  ce 
of the Minister of State—has been lauded in its early phases as a success. 
So far, the prosecutor has been willing to cooperate with the CAO—
a hugely popular oﬃ  ce—thereby demonstrating tangible and mutually 
beneﬁ cial cooperation between government and civil society. 
Support from the business community has been poor to non-
existent. Informed observers mention the lack of business associations 
or any adequate organizations that could bring like-minded business-
men together as the explanation for this lack of support. Th e ACAC’s 
model, based on NGO membership, failed to attract the business 
community.  
Public Support
Public support behind the program appears to be weak. In terms of 
public support, little has been done beyond making information on 
the anticorruption monitoring group available to the public on the 
Internet. 
Political Backing
Th e structures that have been put in place were supported by the then 
minister of state, Ndr Legisi, the senior country representative to the 
Stability Pact Anticorruption Initiative who was directly active in 
facilitating the implementation of the action plan.
However, going beyond the minister of state to the higher levels 
of government—which determine the success or failure of the action 
plan’s more ambitious goals—the picture is much less inspiring. 
International observers concur in their judgement of the poor level 
of political will behind the action plan, despite the creation of the 
structures to implement it. 
International observers concur 
in their judgement of the poor 
level of political will behind 
the action plan
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According to a recent U4 report by the Chr. Michelsen Insti-
tute12: 
 Th is framework [the anticorruption action plan] seems very sensible 
on paper, but if one accepts that the Prime Minister is unwilling or 
unable to instigate a real ﬁ ght against corruption, the whole plan 
with its diﬀ erent levels of monitoring becomes very hollow.13 
Th e U4 report is not alone in being critical of the government’s 
will in the ﬁ ght against corruption. Th e European Commission’s 
Stabilisation and Association Report on Albania in 2003 notes that:
 Although Albania has developed, in close cooperation with the 
international community, a number of mechanisms to ﬁ ght 
strong systemic corruption, actual progress in this area remains 
insuﬃ  cient. Albania has demonstrated its capacity to develop 
action plans, prepare matrixes, and to set up speciﬁ c institutions 
with the objective of ﬁ ghting corruption. However, declarations of 
intent and multilateral events are far from being suﬃ  cient. Fighting 
corruption requires full commitment and political will, and full 
and determined implementation of action plans.14
Th e structure now in place lacks the necessary political backing to 
do its work, regardless of the level of conviction and professionalism 
of its staﬀ . Th e question is whether—if one accepts that the ACMG’s 
work is sustainable—its existence alone and small victories gathered 
along the way are, despite their present apparent lack of success, laying 
the foundations for future reforms, and thus worth the cost. Th is is 
12 Th e Utstein Group Partnership: Th e ministers of international development from 
Germany, the Netherlands, Norway and the United Kingdom ﬁ rst got together as a 
“group” at Utstein Abbey in Norway in 1999. www.u4.no.
13 Harald W. Mathisen, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Donor Roles in face of endemic 
corruption—Albania in the policy debate, U4 Report August 2003, Utstein Anti-
Corruption Resource Center, http://www.u4.no/document/researchreports.cfm.
14 unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/untc/unpan009310.pdf.
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a question that bedevils most attempts to assess the eﬀ ectiveness of 
particular actions, as there are so many diﬀ erent externalities—and not 
always visible ones —that can aﬀ ect outcomes.
4. Assessment: A Mobilizing Force for Reform?
Opportunities
Laying the Foundations for Future Reforms?
Th e structures in place may lay the foundations for future anticorruption 
reforms, in a more benevolent political environment. However, this is 
not the ambition of the action plan. Albania’s legal framework is largely 
up to international standards, and the action plan reﬂ ects this. Th e 
country has entered the implementation stage. Its own agenda for 
2003-2004 is strong on institutional reform and public support, and 
pays considerably less attention to legislative change.15 
Could the Programs Act as a Mobilizing Force for Reform?
Our evidence suggests that the anticorruption action plan and its 
packaging of large-scale institutional as well as legislative reforms in 
one single, well-monitored matrix will only act as a mobilizing force 
if it is strongly supported by relevant civil society groups (including 
business), the international donor community and the highest levels of 
government. Th e structure is in place but will only be validated if there 
is the necessary political backing and public as well as international 
pressure for reform. In the absence of a belief in support from above, 
it is unrealistic to expect oﬃ  cials to take actions that they know can 
generate adverse political reactions.
As was demonstrated in the preceding chapter, there are as of yet 
no coherent public pressure groups that could successfully inﬂ uence 
15 Action plan for the prevention and ﬁ ght against corruption 2003–2004, Council of 
Ministers, Albania, July 2003.
The structure now in place 
will only be validated 
if there is the necessary 
political backing and public 
as well as international 
pressure for reform
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government in matters where the government oﬃ  cials’ own interests are 
at stake. It is true that the Albanian declaration of assets law was passed 
with the help of civil society, but the lack of a coherent movement to 
apply constant pressure and oversee its implementation means that the 
law runs a considerable risk of being ignored.16 In this it would share 
the fate of similar laws in other countries.
One of the initial rationales behind omnibus programs in general 
was to use the mobilizing force of corruption for the implementation 
of necessary far-reaching reforms. Some of the reforms could have been 
done under another “banner”—for instance, improvement of public 
governance, or improvement of democracy. Yet, by including them in 
the anticorruption package it was hoped that governments would be 
more interested in the realization of these reforms, that civil society 
would exercise greater pressure in the process of their implementation, 
and that donors would have more leverage on governmental policy in 
key areas of reform. Our general assessment is that, omnibus programs 
have largely failed to live up to these expectations. In themselves, these 
could hardly generate signiﬁ cant support behind reform packages, 
either among governmental oﬃ  cials or the public at large. Th eir success is 
dependent on the existence of political will and an active civil society. 
Risks
A Prop for the Donor Community
Omnibus anticorruption programs run the risk of transforming a political 
issue into a technical one, which will then be ﬂ aunted to donors as proof 
of the government’s political backing behind anticorruption eﬀ orts. 
Donors should beware equating commissions with commitment. 
16 It is also worth nothing that the inadequacies of the Albanian banking system, as 
well as the sheer number of public oﬃ  cials’ accounts to be monitored by a relatively 
oﬃ  ce staﬀ , are likely to combine and render the law inapplicable as intended. Th ere 
is also an existing risk in that the law might be manipulated for political reasons by 
politicians desirous of getting rid of cumbersome opponents. 
Donors should beware equating 
commissions with commitment
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Th e risk is that donors should continue to market a seemingly 
successful product, while its added value and tangible eﬀ ects have 
yet to be determined. Omnibus anticorruption programs including a 
national anticorruption strategy and plans for its implementation are 
currently being prepared by donors as a reform to be implemented in 
all Southeastern European countries. 
It is a disturbing trend that national anticorruption strategies should 
be applied from country to country with little regard as to whether the 
solution matches the problem. In Albania, close to six years after the 
World Bank’s ﬁ rst attempt at a national anticorruption strategy for the 
country in July 1998, little has yet been achieved.
A Signal of Failure
Th e omnibus programs’ original intent was:
1) to develop the rule of law
2) increase the possibility to attract foreign investment to the country 
3) get closer to negotiations on the Stabilization and Association 
Agreements
1) Develop the rule of law
 In Albania, the PACO program could plausibly maintain that the 
passing of the ethics code as well as the law on the declaration of 
assets by the Council of Ministers has contributed to developing 
the rule of law in the country. However, future developments will 
be judged on substance and not on form. Th e rule of law will only 
prosper in Albania if laws are actually implemented and monitored, 
and, second, if these laws are seen to address meaningful problems. 
As was suggested earlier, without public and political support behind 
them, many laws are unlikely to be successfully implemented in the 
near future. By continuing a pattern whereby laws are passed but 
not implemented, not respected and thus ignored; the program 
arguably contributed to decreasing respect for the rule of law in the 
country. 
The rule of law will only prosper 
in Albania if laws are actually 
implemented and monitored
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2) Increase the possibility of attracting foreign investment
 Both in the Albanian and Macedonian cases, the implementation 
of a national anticorruption strategy was meant by the governments 
in question as a signal to the international community, as well as 
to its own public, that it acknowledged the problem of corruption, 
had taken the ﬁ rst steps to control it, and thus was to be considered 
as a trusted partner and eﬃ  cient government. 
 Th e appearance of anticorruption strategies, accompanied by 
commissions or agencies to monitor them, signal a dramatic 
inability on the part of the existing government institutions to 
deal with corruption. If the government is to send that type of 
signal, it should be soon backed up with tangible proof of results, 
to avoid that the initial strong signal that it sent out should not be 
misread as a signal of powerlessness, increasing the public’s feeling 
of frustration while buttressing foreign investors’ reservations. 
 A recent EBRD study based on the BEEPS results from 1999 to 
2002, found that omnibus anticorruption programs had not led 
to reductions in the levels of either administrative corruption or 
state capture, and that perceptions of corruption were positively 
correlated with the intensity of anticorruption programs. Th e 
EBRD report concluded that:
  highlighting corruption in this fashion [through omnibus 
programs] may have made ﬁ rms more aware of the problem of 
corruption, without necessarily convincing managers that the 
government’s omnibus programs are producing any tangible 
reductions in the obstacles that corruption poses.17
It is also the case that there is little evidence to suggest that an 
appreciable increase of FDI will ﬂ ow to a country simply on the basis 
of its anticorruption policies.
17 Franklin Steves and Alan Rousso, Anti-corruption programmes in post-communist 
transition countries and changes in the business environment, 1999–2002, EBRD 
Working Paper No. 85.
F R O M  T H E  G R O U N D  U P  
53
3) Get closer to negotiations on the Stabilization and Association 
Agreements
 Albania is getting closer to negotiations on the Stabilization and 
Association Agreements, but despite rather than thanks to its anti-
corruption programs. As quoted above, the EC remains skeptical 
that the structures in place bear any link or have any inﬂ uence 
on the government’s level of political will behind the measures 
included in the action plan. 
A Political Tool 
In the highly politicized transition context, there is a risk that the 
structures put up to ﬁ ght corruption might be misused as weapons to 
attack political opponents. Th ere is a particular risk that anticorruption 
commissions or specialized agencies might be manipulated to political 
ends, especially if these have prosecutorial powers.
To the Albanian program’s credit, their strategy advocates a two-
step approach whereby countries should ﬁ rst start with an Albania type 
monitoring group overseeing the implementation of a national strategy, 
before graduating to being an independent oﬃ  ce established by law 
and with legal coercive powers.
It is worth reminding that any specialized anticorruption com-
mission, agency or group has a tendency to either stall or grow in 
power. If it grows in power, as it has in Macedonia recently, it should 
be carefully monitored for any potential abuse. 
Th e Risks Outweigh the Opportunities
Our evidence has shown that government anticorruption programs 
cannot be seen as separate from their surrounding environment, and 
thus cannot be seen as a universally applicable tool. Further, since they 
themselves are crucially dependent on political and public support, 
they cannot be seen as capable of generating such support—their 
mobilization potential for reforms appears limited. Our evidence shows 
There is a risk that the 
structures put up to fi ght 
corruption might be misused 
as weapons to attack political 
opponents
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that too often omnibus anticorruption programs provide seemingly 
tangible proof of action taken against corruption on the part of the 
government eager to follow donor recommendations.
Attempting to implement omnibus anticorruption programs in 
countries where the ﬁ ght against corruption has neither high-level 
government backing nor focused public and civil support will always 
be problematic. Th is is not to say that such programs should never be 
implemented, but rather that their beneﬁ ts should initially be ques-
tioned, and weighed in relation to the country context and opportunities. 
C .  P r o v i d i n g  S o l u t i o n s  t o  t h e  G o v e r n m e n t :  
 I n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e f o r m  P r o j e c t s
1. Common Assumptions18
Th e institutional reform projects that we analyzed aimed to reduce 
corruption as a by-product of the institutional changes that they would 
implement. Th e projects laid out a two-track objectives approach, 
whereby the ﬁ rst, immediate objective was the institutional change 
that they wish to implement, and the second, long-term objective was 
to reduce corruption. 
Th e basic assumption behind these projects was that by changing 
the incentives provided by the institutional environment and the 
18 Th is chapter is chieﬂ y based on observations gathered on the following projects: 
In Albania, the World Bank’s Tirana Transparency Project, European Commission’s 
Customs Administration Project (CAM-Albania) and the Open Society Foundation 
for Albania’s Modernization and Automatization of the Tirana Court; in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, USAID and the World Bank’s Setting Up the Supreme Audit 
Institution; in Bulgaria, the UNDP’s Establishment of a model municipality in 
Razlog, the European Commission PHARE Program project Strengthening the 
Public Prosecutor’s Oﬃ  ce and the Open Society Foundation—Soﬁ a /COLPI’s project 
Strengthening Public Conﬁ dence in the Judiciary; and in Macedonia, the Council of 
Europe and European Commission’s Octopus II program. 
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working ethos of public servants and employees, corruption would 
be reduced in the medium and the long run. By implication, the 
assumption was not that the sources of corruption lay in external 
political, socio-economic forces shaping their work environment. Th e 
assumption was that institutions could be ﬁ xed more or less separately 
from those underlying forces. 
2. Instruments 
We analyzed two types of projects: in-depth institutional reform 
projects, and projects that intended to change the interface between 
government and citizens, usually at the local municipal level. In-
depth institutional reform projects largely used the established tools 
of technical assistance, from training seminars to study tours. Projects 
that intended to change the citizen/government interface tended to use 
a broader array of less well-tested approaches. 
In-depth Institutional Reform Projects 
Th ese projects included, among others, the reform of the public 
prosecutorial oﬃ  ce in Bulgaria, the setting up of State Audit Oﬃ  ces in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the reform of the customs administration 
in Albania. All of these reforms would have had to be eﬀ ected anyhow, 
yet in the Southeastern European context, these were packaged or 
repackaged as part of anticorruption omnibus programs. In terms of 
their impact on corruption, most of these projects were necessarily long 
term. Th e oﬃ  cials involved in the projects that we spoke to generally 
did not consider them as being anticorruption projects. If corruption 
were reduced as a result, it would be tangentially in the long run.
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Administrative Reform Projects Th at Intended to Change the Citizen/
Government Interface
Th e projects’ aim was to develop more transparent lines of communi-
cation between the citizens and government and make public service 
delivery more accountable, transparent and client responsive. 
Th e Front Oﬃ  ce 
Donors created front oﬃ  ces for municipal services in diﬀ erent incar-
nations throughout the region. Th e oﬃ  ces collect information on 
municipal services in one single place, where citizens can access that 
information, receive advice by trained municipal staﬀ  on how to 
proceed with their demands, register complaints against the munici-
pality and in some cases directly interact with the municipality by for 
example, paying their utility bills. Th e projects have the potential to 
take the approach further by adding a process whereby staﬀ  collect 
report cards where citizens register their satisfaction or complaints with 
the municipal services. Civil society organizations can then organize to 
lobby the government to respond to the citizens’ demands. 
3. Eﬀ ects
Immediate Objectives Were Achieved
Most of the projects that we analyzed succeeded in achieving the 
immediate objectives that they had set out for themselves. 
In the two cases in our study where institutions were either created 
from scratch—like the Supreme Audit Institutions in BiH—or were 
entirely redrawn after a system breakdown, in the case of the Albanian 
Customs Administration, the projects were successful in their initial 
goals. In BiH, three Supreme Audit Institutions (SAI) were created for 
each level of government in the country. Despite fears that the SAIs 
would oﬀ er convenient political tools in the partisan confrontations 
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customary in the country at the time, the SAIs largely managed to 
break away from partisan expectations and to present on the whole 
independent reports to parliament. In Albania, the reinvigoration of 
the customs administration by the EC customs assistance project was 
seen in its early phases as an overwhelming success. Since 1997, customs 
revenues have been continuously increasing despite a reduction in 
custom duties. Th is trend has been reversed only in the past two years, 
and revenues are once again decreasing. 
By providing citizens with one convenient location to go to process 
documents or pay utility bills, the front oﬃ  ces or “one-stop-shops”—
a tried and tested staple of anticorruption aid—proved successful in a 
Southeastern European setting. Th e oﬃ  ces were popular—in Razlog, 
out of a population of 12,000, the oﬃ  ce was visited on average 10 to 50 
times a day—and clearly responded to a need by the population. In local 
surveys in both Razlog and Tirana, citizens mentioned “impolite staﬀ ” 
and “mistakes made by the administration” as their main complaints 
towards the local administration. By training the staﬀ  to be more 
responsive to citizens’ demands, and by streamlining the administrative 
process, the oﬃ  ces contributed to creating a better environment for 
citizens and government to interact on a day to day basis. 
Change in Working Culture
In the most successful cases we analyzed, the training that the state 
oﬃ  cials received contributed to a marked change in the institution 
concerned. In Albania, the Customs Assistance Mission sponsored 
by the European Commission focused on implementing an open and 
transparent personnel policy, coupled with built in incentives—seizure 
rewards and performance pay. Th e project successfully adapted Western 
best practices liberally to suit the Albanian context.19 Th is combination 
19 For example by establishing a personnel policy within the custom code rather than in 
the civil service code, which risked not being implemented until a much later date; or 
by instituting seizure rewards, a practice no longer in use in the UK but was deemed 
useful in the Albanian context to bolster the custom oﬃ  cials’ incentives not to engage 
in corruption.
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succeeded in reforming the Albanian Customs Service. Th e project 
succeeded in its immediate objective, in the words of a senior aid 
oﬃ  cial involved in the project: “to make being a customs oﬃ  cer a 
career worth having,” and this no longer on the basis of the bribes that 
an oﬃ  cer could expect to receive.
Long Term Objectives
Despite these early successes, most of the projects we surveyed aiming 
at in-depth institutional reform could not be qualiﬁ ed as overwhelming 
successes. In all cases, external political developments and pressures had 
a negative impact on the projects, in some cases a determining one. 
For example, many of the early successes of the Customs Administ-
ration project in Albania were reversed after a number of personnel 
changes in key positions in the aftermath of the 2001 national 
elections. Th e heads of the custom houses were replaced, as well as the 
director general’s positions, which went on to change hands ﬁ ve times 
over the next 15 months. 
Political impediments obstructed the implementation or mere 
debates of recommendations issued by the donor projects. In Bosnia, 
the creation of the Supreme Audit Institutions has been a success in 
institution building, but the SAIs have yet to demonstrate that the 
entities and state government take heed of their recommendations. 
Front Oﬃ  ces Contributed to Reducing Administrative Corruption
In contrast to most of the projects surveyed, the front oﬃ  ces provided a 
tangible example of a project that certainly had the potential to directly 
reduce corruption. Th e one-stop-shop or front oﬃ  ce projects succeeded 
both in undermining petty corruption by shedding light on citizen/
government transactions, and in increasing trust between citizens and 
government. In the projects we surveyed there remained however, no 
guarantees for the citizens that the complaints they registered with the 
front oﬃ  ces would be followed up. 
In all cases, external political 
developments and pressures 
had a negative impact on 
the projects, in some cases a 
determining one
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Creation of a Model Municipality in Razlog
Th e UNDP Model Municipality Razlog project was a demonstration 
project, implemented in the Razlog municipality, which aimed to 
convince the Bulgarian government to take over the project and 
apply the model nationwide. Yet a host of major international donor 
organizations (UNDP, USAID, DfID) have implemented projects in 
the small, provincial municipality of Razlog since 1995, which cannot 
be considered as an average local Bulgarian municipality. Th e Razlog 
project was over-resourced ﬁ nancially and in the level of energy and 
time devoted to it.  
By deference to the need to convince the Bulgarian government 
to implement the project nationwide, negative eﬀ ects and diﬃ  culties 
faced by the implementers were played down. It is unlikely that the 
donor could repeat that success elsewhere. Th e model was set in such 
conditions that it could not be replicable. 
4. Underlying Problems
In every single successful project that we surveyed, the presence of a 
high-level political backer within the institution was a key, if not the 
determining factor in the project’s success. In Albania, the fact that the 
incoming director general of customs, Petrit Ago, at the beginning of 
the EC’s Custom Assistance Mission project was both fully supportive 
and the longest serving director general ever was crucial to its early 
success, according to oﬃ  cials involved in the project. 
Th e Forest is Growing Back
In the cases we outlined, even projects that were well-conceived, well-
run, and aided by good coordination between donors, could still be 
overwhelmed by the underlying political structures that shape the 
countries’ administration. Returning to our original assumption, our 
The presence of a high-level 
political backer within the 
institution was a key, 
if not the determining factor 
in the project’s success
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ﬁ ndings indicate that that institutional reform projects could hardly 
be seen as separate from the underlying political forces that shape 
a country’s political climate and a public administration’s working 
climate. 
Th e most successful institutional projects we surveyed operated 
at the lower end of public administration, where citizens meet the 
government. A lot of learning has taken place in this ﬁ eld, with 
obvious results. Yet, donors appear to have underestimated the power 
of the underlying corrupt networks that can exist in deeply corrupt or 
captured societies, and to have been unprepared for it. 
Successful Models Must be Replicable
Th e Model Municipality Razlog project appeared to be a success from 
the outset, but beneﬁ ted from such a favorable working environment 
that it is unlikely to be as successful elsewhere. Donors cannot sustain 
that level of funding, energy and favorable political context. It is by 
overcoming those day to day diﬃ  culties in project implementation that 
common projects become best practices.
Model projects should reﬂ ect the diﬃ  culties of project implement-
ation, rather than avoid them. 
D .  C r o s s - C u t t i n g  O b s e r v a t i o n s
Th e Projects All Reported to Have No Direct Impact on Corruption 
In all cases, the projects listed reducing corruption as one of their 
core objectives; yet based on interview material and project reports, 
none of the donors claimed that their projects had eﬀ ectively reduced 
corruption. Projects listed their immediate objectives as successes, 
stressing that these contributed to the ﬁ ght against corruption, but 
could in no way be seen to have tangibly reduced corruption.
Model projects should refl ect 
the diffi culties of project 
implementation, 
rather than avoid them
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Th e Donor Community is Sending a Mixed Message on Corruption
In terms of public awareness raising and civil society mobilization, 
donor-sponsored projects portray corruption mainly as a political 
phenomenon. Th e message is that the political system of the country 
is dominated by corrupt actors, which leads to economic under-
performance, poverty, etc. Th is is a strong, galvanizing message, which 
keeps corruption high on the public agenda in Southeastern Europe.
In terms of anticorruption measures, however, the answer is eco-
nomic or administrative: changes in the incentive structure, institutional 
reform and improvements mainly in the bureaucracy and the judiciary, 
etc. Although a political problem in the mind of the public, corruption 
is being fought mainly by economic and administrative remedies. Th is 
is a confusing message, which donors have repeatedly sent. Th ere was a 
mismatch between the public’s understanding of the problem, and the 
solutions oﬀ ered by the donors.
Lack of Evaluation
Th e overwhelming majority of the projects that we analyzed were 
not subjected to any type of external evaluation by their donors. 
Considering the number of unknowns in the ﬁ ght against corruption, 
this is striking. 
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I I .  C O N C L U S I O N S
A .  S t a t e  o f  S t r a t e g i c  T h i n k i n g
In this chapter, we would like to place our ﬁ ndings in the framework of 
the current state of strategic thinking on anticorruption policy. 
After a ﬁ rst phase running from the early to late 1990s centered 
largely on awareness raising, and a second phase starting in the mid-
1990s centered on international conventions, anticorruption reform has 
entered its third and crucial phase: implementation. It is now that the 
necessary groundwork has been done that anticorruption assistance 
must show results in curbing corruption. If it does not, there is a 
pressing risk that the advances made over the past years might be 
jeopardized. 
As we see it, there are three main directions in which thinking on 
anticorruption is developing:
• increased focus on politics;
• understanding corrupt networks and how to break them; and
• putting pressure on corrupt governments.
Increased Focus on Politics
Th e successes of anticorruption assistance so far have largely been 
in the domain of administrative corruption. In countries where the 
political leadership appeared willing and committed to implement 
anticorruption reform (e.g. Latvia in 1997), there has been demonstrable 
success in lowering levels of administrative corruption.20 In countries 
where levels of administrative corruption are higher, results have been 
less forthcoming.
20 A recent EBRD report based on analysis of the BEEPS surveys conﬁ rmed the earlier 
argument (Shah and Huther 2000) that countries with low levels of administrative 
corruption are more likely to adopt intensive anticorruption programs than countries 
with high levels of administrative corruption, regardless of the level of state capture. 
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Correspondingly, while there have been isolated cases of success in 
decreasing administrative corruption, donors have yet to ﬁ nd eﬃ  cient 
ways of targeting state capture. Th ere is a pervasive feeling within donor 
organizations supporting anticorruption assistance that traditional 
public sector management and conventional legal approaches to 
ﬁ ghting corruption do not hold the key to breaking the bad governance 
equilibrium in which many of the transition countries are mired. 
Th ere is a need to directly confront states where governments have 
shown little political will to implement anticorruption reform and 
where anticorruption assistance has stalled due to a pervasively corrupt 
surrounding environment.
In response to this demand, two policy solutions have emerged thus far.
Understanding Networks of Inﬂ uence
Donors have laid increasing focus on understanding the functioning of 
networks of inﬂ uence both within and between government and society, 
and deconstructing the notion of governmental “political will” which 
stands as a barrier to reform. Th e assumption is that by reaching a more 
sophisticated understanding of how networks of inﬂ uence function 
and to whom higher levels of government may be accountable, donors 
will be able to target their reforms with better precision towards those 
areas where they are likely to meet least resistance, and use those initial 
successes as building blocks towards future reform. In response, donors 
are developing stakeholder and network analysis methods that might 
enable them to locate entry points for reform. 
Th e search for entry points in the ﬁ ght against corruption has 
been present since its very inception, yet most donor successes, in 
taking advantage of political agency to suit their development goals, 
have relied on opportunistic judgements made at the country level. 
To maximize the chances of taking advantage of the windows of 
opportunity that may open countries to reform, donors have sought to 
develop ﬂ exibility, deconcentration of decision making to ﬁ eld oﬃ  ces 
and rapid reaction units within their programming.
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Increase Pressure on Corrupt Governments
Faced with the deadlock in which many transition countries ﬁ nd 
themselves, donors recommend a heavier focus on external account-
ability mechanisms designed to put pressure on governments and break 
the bad governance equilibrium they ﬁ nd themselves in. 
Solutions range from increasing civil society monitoring, parlia-
mentary oversight, citizen oversight committees as well as international 
pressure thanks to incentive driven approaches—EU accession, NATO/ 
WTO memberships, IFI conditionalities—buttressed with the threat 
of strong sanctions.
B .  S t r a t e g i c  I m p l i c a t i o n s  
1. Anticorruption at a Crossroads
Anticorruption in Southeastern Europe is at an important crossroads. 
Th e scope for public awareness raising has been exhausted: corruption 
is now perceived as a serious problem in the region. Th e challenge now 
is how to transform this perception into a lasting motivation by the 
public and the governments to pursue further meaningful reforms. 
Need to Meet the Public’s Expectations
Most anticorruption projects concentrated on institutional reforms. 
Public awareness campaigns intended to stress the economic con-
sequences of corruption and thus imply an institutional solution. In a 
political climate where the beneﬁ ts of transition have been unequally 
distributed, the public seized on the anticorruption debate to fuel its 
dissatisfaction with government and their own economic and social 
status. Th us, the anticorruption rhetoric promoted by the donors was 
politicized by the public. In the absence of tangible (in the eyes of the 
The challenge now is how to 
transform this perception into a 
lasting motivation by the public 
and the governments to pursue 
further meaningful reforms
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public) results in the ﬁ ght against corruption, corruption becomes 
more visible and has a higher proﬁ le, while public frustration risks 
growing, with nefarious political consequences. 
Politicians and donors must respond to the high public expectations 
that their programs created. If they do not, there is a risk that the volatile 
political climate—created in part by those programs, where mutual 
accusations of corruption ﬂ y freely in the media—risk provoking a 
return to political instability as opportunist parties take advantage of 
the anticorruption rhetoric to suit their particular political agendas, or 
to the public’s frustration, increasing voter apathy and disillusionment 
with equally damaging results for democracy in the Balkans. 
Anticorruption Caught in the Cynicism Trap 
Once the public has witnessed the consequences of failed anticorruption 
projects—once expectations have been thwarted—a considerable 
amount of energy must be spent on breaking the cynicism barrier that 
those failed projects created. 
Anticorruption reform has had such a high public proﬁ le that 
future anticorruption projects in the region must take into account the 
fact that they are building on the consequences of past failed projects. 
Donors have been more successful in creating demand for reform than 
in providing solutions to match that demand. In order to maintain 
public support behind anticorruption projects, future projects—both 
on the demand and on the supply side—must take the public’s realistic 
expectations into account.21
21 Th e authors are grateful for comments made by participants during the OECD DAC 
GOVNET workshop on Lessons Learned in Anticorruption, February 18–19, 2004, 
Paris. 
Politicians and donors must 
respond to the high public 
expectations that their 
programs created
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Need to Create Safeguards 
Against Accusations of Corruption
In an environment where corruption has been hoisted 
as the major political topic of the country, allegations of 
corrupt misconduct abound. Th ere has been little research 
as to whether allegations made or relayed by the media, 
picking up on public awareness campaigns, are indeed 
followed up upon.
One project that we analyzed, “Social eﬀ ects of 
investigative in the ﬁ eld of corruption,”22 successfully 
sought to retrace whether allegations of corruption made 
in the mainstream media had been followed up upon 
by the judiciary. Politicians and businessmen accused of 
corruption must be given the opportunity to prove their 
innocence; if they have no means to defend themselves 
against allegations of corruption, they will have no 
incentives not to be corrupt. 
Th e Current Conceptualization of Anticorruption Reform Fuels Th is 
Frustration
Th e broad and all encompassing nature of corruption as a problem 
encourages the development of broad and all encompassing solutions 
to ﬁ ght it.
Our ﬁ ndings on the eﬀ ects of civil society coalitions in Southeastern 
Europe buttress this argument. Th e coalitions failed to attract the broad 
backing they were designed to bring together, and tangible results of 
their actions were few and far between. Th e biggest successes claimed 
by the biggest coalition projects could have probably been reached 
cheaper, by other means. 
22 Open Society Fund BiH, 2003
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Th e same diagnostic may be reached with donor sponsored and 
encouraged governmental omnibus anticorruption programs, which 
have failed to conclusively reduce corruption or to reassure the public 
and foreign investors. 
Th e conceptualization of corruption as one unifying problem to 
rebel against was instrumental to gather the necessary public backing 
behind the issue of anticorruption reform and government acceptance 
of the problem of corruption. Campaigners successfully argued that 
ﬁ ghting corruption was in the public interest. In that ﬁ rst phase, anti-
corruption rhetoric had the potential to act as a mobilizer for reform. 
Today, broad public awareness campaigns have reached saturation 
point in the region, and Southeastern European countries have now 
all hit the stumbling block of implementation. Th e pressure that was 
created behind anticorruption did not succeed in making governments 
that beneﬁ ted from corruption recognize their own incentive to act in 
a non-corrupt way. 
Th e erstwhile conceptualization of anticorruption has become 
counter-productive when it comes to mustering civil society support 
to create a sustainable pressure group to inﬂ uence governmental policy. 
Th ere is a need to go beyond awareness to implementation.
2. Th e Road Ahead
 Anticorruption and Democratic Representation
If it is to be successful, and if it is to avoid disappointing the public and 
threatening rather than strengthening democratic institutions, anti-
corruption reform must be re-politicized. Th e depoliticization of 
corruption was a useful tool in the early to mid-1990s to go beyond 
culturally relativistic deﬁ nitions of the term. Now that corruption has 
eﬀ ectively been accepted as a mainstream barrier to development, it is 
time to recognize the political nature of corruption and anticorruption 
reform.
Broad public awareness 
campaigns have reached 
saturation point in the region
The erstwhile conceptualization 
of anticorruption has become 
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In our case studies, donors sought to avoid appearing to play too 
great a role in anticorruption politics. Yet the most successful anti-
corruption projects were confrontational and thus political. 
Donors have an interest in not being seen to interfere in clients’ 
domestic aﬀ airs, and go to great lengths to avoid the appearance of 
interference. Yet, in practice, supporting anticorruption reform in a 
country is an avowedly political undertaking. Th e public demand for 
anticorruption reform the donors created was of a political nature.  
If donors are to be successful in implementing anticorruption 
reform, they will have to accept the political nature of their reforms. 
Anticorruption programming will have to reconcile itself with politics. 
Th is implies both doing more work with political parties, as well as a 
more acute understanding of the political context and repercussions of 
projects. 
Political Party Reform 
Th ere is a striking lack of work done on political party reform in 
the Balkans, and this despite the central role played by parties both 
as producers of corruption, and potential planks for an exchange of 
constructive anticorruption reform ideas. 
In order to address this problem, donors should go much beyond 
technical assistance for amendments to laws on political parties, which 
sum up the current forms of involvement (where existent). Th e main 
rationale of future activities should be on encouraging political parties 
to become active anticorruption players. Donors should put pressure 
on political parties to:
• Take a strong, public approach on to their position towards 
corruption: Th e donor community should take a stance on 
allegations of links between parties and corrupt actors, press for 
the investigation of these links, and the development of preventive 
measures and policies.
• Apply principles of transparency and accountability in their own 
internal aﬀ airs.
If donors are to be successful 
in implementing anticorruption 
reform, they will have 
to accept the political nature 
of their reforms
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• Foster democratic practices within their own organizations.
• Demonstrate in their political manifestos that they have a coherent 
policy of tackling corruption and put these into eﬀ ect forthwith 
upon being elected.
Rather than a single anticorruption program, the public should be 
presented with a selection of alternative anticorruption reform 
proposals. Th e public should be given the choice between multiple 
solutions to the corruption problem—and exercise that choice by 
voting—rather than having a single, central anticorruption reform 
agenda imposed upon them. 
If bilateral and multilateral donors do not wish to be seen taking 
such a strong stance in a country’s political agenda, political party 
reform could be subcontracted through specialized funds to western 
political foundations. European center-left, liberal, and center-right 
parties could be involved in the monitoring for transparency, internal 
democracy and accountability of Southeastern European members. 
Membership in these organizations should become contingent on the 
adoption of strict and far-reaching anticorruption party programs.
A Pluralistic Vision of Civil Society 
Th e focus of the donor’s nongovernmental support programs has 
so far been directed towards civil society groups, based on the bird 
watching model. In addition to the political party reform agenda 
mentioned above, major players in anticorruption reform have also 
gone unaided. For example, there has been little support to professional 
lawyer organizations. All complex schemes of corruption are done with 
the help of lawyers, and yet there are virtually no cases of disbarring 
lawyers (advocates), or applying anticorruption peer pressure. Equally, 
there has been little help to trade unions, or business associations. All 
civil society projects that we analyzed bemoaned the lack of private 
sector involvement in their activities. 
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Beyond the focus on government and civil society, anticorruption 
eﬀ orts should also focus on important semi-autonomous, semi-self-
regulating organizations such as political parties and their foundations, 
professional organizations and trade unions. Internal accountability 
measures, transparency measures and internal democracy in some cases, 
should be encouraged. 
Flexible Project Design 
Adopting a ﬂ exible approach to project design has been at the forefront 
of the debate over democracy assistance for the past decade. Nowhere 
is this need more acute than in anticorruption assistance, where the 
political repercussions of failed projects are potentially so high, and 
opportunities to act so short-lived. 
Donors should build public interest coalitions responding to the 
public’s needs in anticorruption reform, rather than the donor agenda. 
For this to be possible, project design must be timely and ﬂ exible 
enough to respond to public needs and opportunities as they present 
themselves, rather than responding to a much slower, less reactive 
donor agenda for change.
From Coalitions to Networks
If they are to succeed, anticorruption coalitions must represent 
the public’s interests and needs, rather than the donors. Th ey must 
be “homegrown” if they are to have any legitimacy. Despite the 
considerable eﬀ orts made by the donor to distance itself from the 
project and the considerable engagement of local actors in running 
the coalition, the ACAC in Albania still lacked legitimacy and was 
popularly seen as USAID’s coalition. 
Large-scale coalitions failed to materialize into eﬀ ective pressure 
groups. We need to learn the lessons of why anticorruption coalitions 
failed to attract business, trade unions or civil society organizations 
beyond a hard core of mostly aid-dependent NGO service providers. 
If they are to succeed, 
anticorruption coalitions 
must represent the public’s 
interests and needs, 
rather than the donors
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Th ese appear to be that:
• coalitions failed to attract businesses, because businesses could not 
see their direct interest in participating; 
• coalitions failed to be sustainable with the civil society sector; 
because they failed to respond to the public’s demands. 
Coalitions come in diﬀ erent shapes and sizes, from informal 
networks where participants share information only, have no organized 
meetings, and do not take joint positions, to formal coalitions with a 
name, formal leadership, eligibility rules, and possibly a dues structure. 
Above all, coalitions need to oﬀ er someone a service. 
We suggest breaking up anticorruption coalitions into public 
interest networks, by fostering networks around common public 
interests to ﬁ ght the consequences of a particular type of corruption. 
Th e most successful networks, responding to a distinct need, might 
naturally gravitate towards a more formal structure, with the help 
of donor assistance. Th ose who rent public housing, those who do 
business with customs, those who drive on the roads—each group has 
a strong interest in combating a particular area of corruption which is 
lost when the objective is to ﬁ ght corruption on all fronts.
If civil society groups ally around a particular, well-chosen reform 
area—now that corruption has been widely recognized as being 
detrimental to development—there is a strong likelihood that the 
groups—from the private and the public sector—that suﬀ er from the 
consequences of corruption in that one area, might join civil society-led 
ad hoc networks.
Risk of Agenda-setting
Th e risk involved in this approach is that donors might further set the 
public and civil society agenda in the country, rather than empowering 
civil society and responding to public problems. 
In response, we suggest not only that donors listen rather than 
dictate, and respond accordingly, but also that public interest networks 
We suggest breaking up 
anticorruption coalitions into 
public interest networks
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should respond to public problems as diagnosed in household surveys. 
If people want to see change in healthcare reform, donors should seek 
the relevant NGOs and interest groups, and encourage them to come 
together. Th is could be done via a central NGO, be it a Transparency 
International chapter or some other entry point. 
If anticorruption reform is to strengthen democracy, it must 
respond to the public’s needs.  
We conclude that public interest networks are the solution to the 
three main problems that beset donors’ coalitions’ eﬀ orts at present:
1. “Th e coalitions were not suﬃ  ciently broad ”
 Breadth in and of itself is not an indicator of success. Public Interest 
networks will gather broad backing when it is relevant and needed, 
but could also successfully bring together only one type of actors. 
Th e more networks are developed, the more groups will become 
involved.
2. “Th e coalitions were not sustainable”
 Where successful, public interest networks will naturally gravitate 
towards more formal structures, thus strengthening the likelihood 
that they might be sustainable. If they are needs-based, coalitions 
should be sustainable. 
3. “Th e coalitions’ non-confrontational approach to government sat 
uneasily with their public mandate”
 Now that governments in the region have widely accepted the 
problem of corruption, the subject is no longer taboo and there 
is no need for civil society to fear alienating themselves by directly 
confronting government on the topic. Future coalitions can aﬀ ord 
to be confrontational towards government, if that confrontation is 
focused on one reform area where the government is challenged to 
respond eﬀ ectively.
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Th is approach, if combined with pressure from relevant inter-
national organizations could succeed in inﬂ uencing governmental 
policy on anticorruption in Southeastern Europe.
Th is implies increased ﬂ exibility on the part of the donors, as 
well as a recognition and reconciliation with the political nature of 
anticorruption reform. 
Lessons Learned from Omnibus Programs and Institutional Projects 
Omnibus Programs Are Not Universal Tools
Donors should be cautious when treating national anticorruption 
strategies as their main tool. Strategies risk being largely meaningless 
if a government is uncommitted to the ﬁ ght against corruption and 
the associated risks are considerable. Donors should bear these risks in 
mind when recommending the development and implementation of 
wide-ranging national anticorruption strategies. 
Our ﬁ ndings show that omnibus anticorruption programs are by 
no means a neutral ﬁ rst step in anticorruption assistance, even if the 
implementation mechanism of the anticorruption strategy is gradual 
and follows a well developed implementation mechanism (as was 
the case in Albania). Rather than ﬁ rst opting for omnibus programs, 
donors should focus on the key areas where corruption can and should 
urgently be fought, and who the actors are who might support them in 
achieving these goals. 
In countries where donors feel that the incentives for the govern-
ment—EU Accession, NATO membership—to comply with donor 
recommendations give them suﬃ  cient bargaining power, they might 
pursue the implementation of governmental omnibus anticorruption 
programs, but with strong monitoring mechanisms in place to ensure 
implementation and a willingness to apply direct sanctions if the 
governments fail to comply. So far, this has not been the case. 
Donors should focus on the key 
areas where corruption can and 
should urgently be fought
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Need To Show Results to the Public
Most government anticorruption programs lack a crucial component: 
how to maintain public support in and maintain support behind the 
reforms that the program seeks to implement. 
Th e immediate eﬀ ect of national anticorruption strategies is to raise 
public expectations of the reforms’ success, while signalling to foreign 
investors the inability of the government’s present institutions to deal 
with corruption. If these initial eﬀ ects are not backed up with tangible, 
visible results in the short term, the national anticorruption strategies 
risk having a largely negative eﬀ ect. 
Institutional Projects Need a Supportive Environment to Succeed
Lessons have been learned throughout the world concerning institution 
building. Most recently, experts have stressed the importance of taking 
the surrounding environment into account in institutional reform 
and by locating adequate entry points, constituencies or individual 
“champions” of reform. Th e need to remain engaged for a longer-
term period in a recipient country, as well as to seek to understand 
and adapt Western best practices to the local context have also been 
stressed. In our ﬁ ndings, this is fully conﬁ rmed and highlighted in the 
anticorruption context with our case studies. 
Th e most successful case studies were those such as the Customs 
Assistance Mission in Albania which sought to adapt Western best 
practices to the Albanian context. Yet even those projects could still 
be overwhelmed by the underlying political structures that shape the 
countries’ administration.
Institutional changes must be followed with adequate monitoring 
and implementation if they are to be successful. Our ﬁ ndings would 
suggest the need for more intensive follow-up monitoring of the 
implementation of institutional reform projects, as well as a more acute 
understanding of the political forces at work behind the scenes in order 
to seek to forestall or anticipate any coming upset. 
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In practical terms, in Albania, the EC’s Customs Assistance Mission 
had rightly set up a monitoring system for key administrative posts. 
Yet, when the new government proceeded to replace a high number of 
key posts in the customs administration, the project and its backer were 
powerless to defend the ground that had been won.
Th ese warnings are ampliﬁ ed in contexts where donors believe that 
they hold suﬃ  cient sway over the country’s government for it to heed 
their warning. For example, political conditionalities stipulating the 
number and reasons behind key position changes in the administration 
might be used to help guarantee stability. 
Th e Road Ahead
Th ere are still ample opportunities for reviving anticorruption as a 
mobilizational tool for democracy promotion and good governance 
reforms. Th is revival necessitates, in our opinion, certain deep strategic 
changes. 
Firstly, anticorruption campaigns should not alienate citizens from 
the political processes of their countries, and should not further public 
cynicism and distrust vis-à-vis the political sphere. Citizens should 
be encouraged to ﬁ ght corruption through the democratic, political 
mechanisms of representation, which are the most reliable channels of 
citizen impact on the policymaking process in a democracy. 
  Secondly, we suggest that donors should deepen their concepts 
of civil society and civil society mobilization. Th ey should include as 
anticorruption partners representatives of civil society that have so far 
been neglected, such as trade unions, professional organizations, etc. 
Donors should adopt a more pluralistic understanding of civil society 
and abandon the idea of gathering all behind a common understanding 
of the character of corruption and its remedies. In a pluralistic society 
this is not a feasible project: diﬀ erent groups may have competing ideas 
of the common good and corruption. By trying to create all-embracing 
movements and coalitions, donors in fact forfeit the opportunity to 
Citizens should be encouraged 
to fi ght corruption through 
the democratic, political 
mechanisms of representation
Donors should adopt a more 
pluralistic understanding 
of civil society
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mobilize important sub-groups of civil society, which may be serious 
partners in anticorruption projects. 
Finally, our study questions the added advantage of packaging 
reforms in a single, omnibus program. Rather than opting for an 
omnibus approach, donors, when starting work on anticorruption in 
a country, should ﬁ rst ask themselves which sectors are likely to be the 
most corrupt, what type of corruption should and can be tackled in the 
ﬁ rst instance and who are the actors most likely to support and work 
for the eﬀ ective implementation of such changes.
If anticorruption reforms are layered within the political process 
and meet public needs, the long-awaited mobilizational potential of the 
anticorruption agenda might yet be realized.
Th e Center for Policy Studies is an academic unit within the Central 
European University, dedicated to identifying and analyzing policy 
issues. Our belief is that the experiences of post-socialist transition 
can be usefully shared with countries enduring great social 
transformation, but that the translation of these local experiences 
requires a sound appreciation of policy contexts. We are committed 
to strengthening local capacity for critical policy analysis and pursue 
research that is interdisciplinary and carried out with partners in 
the wider policy community. We work closely with institutes and 
researchers from the region, develop education programs in public 
policy, and, in conjunction with the Open Society Institute, provide 
an annual fellowship program. 
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